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INTRODUCTION

All human behavior can be understood from two perspectives.
The first, which can be thought of as objective in nature, holds that
conduct is always the product of some matrix of causal factors that
necessarily determines choice. 1 The second, which one writer has

labeled the "participant" perspective, 2 regards the great bulk of
human activity as having been produced through the agency of an
individual's free will.3 It is this second perspective that is generally
given voice in the criminal law.

1Generally, this article will refer to this perspective as "determinism." Mark
Kelman has provided a useful definition of determinist discourse in suggesting that
it "pictures conduct in structuralist, backward-regarding, amoral terms, holding that
conduct is simply a last event we focus on in a chain of connected events so
predetermined as to merit neither respect nor condemnation." MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86 (1987) [hereinafter KELMAN, GUIDE TO CLS];
see also Mark Kelman, InterpretiveConstructionin the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN.
L. REv. 591 (1981) [hereinafter Kelman, InterpretiveConstruction](examining doctrinal
arguments in the substantive criminal law).
The determinist perspective can be thought of as "objective" in the sense that it
is a "theoretical construct which fits the observed data" regarding the actual origins
of human behavior. Robert P. Knight, Determinism, "Freedom," and Psychotherapy, 9
PSYCHIATRY 251, 255 (1946). Free choice, by contrast, involves the "subjective
psychological experience" by which notions of intentionalism are attributed to an
individual actor. Id.
2 See P.F. STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM: SOME VARIETIES 38 (1985)
[hereinafter STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM]; P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and
Resentment [hereinafter STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment], in FREEDOM AND
RESENTMENT 1, 1-25 (1974).
' Generally, this perspective will be referred to here as "intentionalism." Kelman
explains that intentionalist discourse "pictures human action in phenomenological,
forward-looking, free-will-oriented terms, emphasizing the indeterminacy of action
and, correlatively, the ethical responsibilities of actors." KELMAN, GUIDE TO CLS,
supra note 1, at 86.
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Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to these
competing perspectives and to the ways in which criminal law
doctrine reflects an ongoing tension between them.4 Some of this
scholarship has addressed directly the special problems posed by
chemically-dependent5 offenders, since both perspectives can so
plausibly explain alcoholic or addictive behavior.6 In fact, a careful
study of the criminal law's treatment of chemical dependency forces
to the surface this essential tension and creates an unusual opportunity to consider fundamental questions of human personality and
action.
The thesis of this article is that the criminal law-indeed, the
legal system generally--does more than simply express an intentionalist perspective. Rather, it is a vital societal mechanism by which
that perspective is created and maintained, and the causal or
objective perspective obscured.
A key element in this construction 7 of individual responsibility,
4 See, e.g., KELMAN, GUIDE TO CLS, supra note 1 (summarizing and assessing CLS
writings on law); Michael S. Moore, Causationand the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091
(1985) (presenting competing theories of punishment); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Deser4
Punishmen and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1986)
(discussing the "causal theory of excuse").
s
_ is considerable terminological confusion surrounding alcoholism and drug
addiction. See generally MARK KELLER ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF WoRDs ABOUT
ALCOHOL 6-27 (2d ed. 1982) (defining terms used to describe addiction and types of
alcoholism); Aubrey Lewis, Introduction: Definitions and Perspectives, in SCIENTIFIC
BAsIs OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 5, 5-11 (Hannah Steinberg ed., 1969) (discussing the
meaning of "drug dependence"). Most professionals who work in the treatment field
now speak of alcoholism and drug addiction in terms of substance abuse or chemical
dependence. See, e.g., Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and CriminalResponsibility, 84
YALE L.J. 413,421 n.42 (1975) (listingsources reviewing the definitionalinadequacies
of the term "addiction"). This article will follow that practice.
6 Examples include Fingarette, supra note 5, at 417-27;Jerome Hall, Intoxication
and CriminalResponsibility,57 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1944); Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 393 (1988); see also
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 846-47 (1978) (comparing differing
views of the legal effect of intoxication in various countries); Kelman, InterpretiveConstruction, supra note 1, at 600-03 (examining the "status versus conduct distinction"
in the criminal law); Moore, supra note 4, at 1103 (explaining the distinction between
the legal defenses of addiction and intoxication).
7 The choice of the word "construction" here is quite deliberate, and is meant to
suggest what David Trubek has termed a "very strong 'cultural' view of social
relations, one in which society is in some real sense 'constituted' by systems of
meaning." David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricism,
36 STAN. L. REV. 575,599 (1984). This way of thinking about social institutions draws
heavily upon the work of Louis Althusser, who has shown that some institutions
"produce" ideology while others simply "transmit" ways of understanding the world.
See Alan Hunt, The Ideology ofLaw: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the
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and a key feature of excuse theory generally, is the criminal law's
rather stylized treatment of the human capacity for practical
reasoning.8 As a theoretical matter, it is fair to assert that the
process of practical reasoning, through which alternative courses of
conduct are weighed and decisions reached, is itself, in every
instance, fully determined by factors beyond the autonomous
control of the actor. 9 At the same time, conduct which results
from this sort of cognitive work does seem to belong to the human
actor. It is in this respect that conduct can be simultaneously
described as determined and free.
For purposes of figuring criminal responsibility, however, a
dualist conception of conduct will not suffice. If the actor can be
said to have engaged in a process of practical reasoning, responsibility ordinarily will be assigned and the matrix of causal factors that
shaped that reasoning process will, along the way, be obscured. If,
on the other hand, the actor was unable in a meaningful fashion to
engage in the cognitive enterprise essential to decision making, it is
likely that responsibility will not be assigned and the deterministic
roots of his or her conduct will remain visible.
Because both an intentionalist and a determinist account can
readily be applied to the behavior of chemically-dependent actors,
the treatment that courts have accorded the occasional requests for
recognition of a loss-of-control excuse ° offers an unusual oppor-

Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11, 18 (1985)
(discussing Louis ALTHUSSER, Ideology and the IdeologicalState Apparatuses, in LENIN

AND PHILOSOPHY (Ben Brewster trans., 1971)). For an anthropological view of the
.constructional role of law," see CUFloRD GEERTz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in
ComfarativePerspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE First Page, 230-31 (1983).
The writer who has most clearly articulated the theoretical links between
practical reasoning and individual responsibility is Michael Moore. See Moore, supra
note 4; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE
RELATIONSHIP chs. 1 & 2 (1984) (explaining that the idea of practical reason is a
central concept in our "understanding of ourselves" and "the legal view of persons");
infra text accompanying notes 69-79.
9 Se e.g.,John Hospers, What Means This Freedom?,in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM 26, 32 (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966) (considering whether, in the final analysis,
we are "responsiblefor any of our actions at all"); see also infra notes 107-108 and
accompanying text.
10 As a doctrinal matter, chemically-dependent criminal defendants have raised a
variety of defenses over the years, variously styled as affirmative defenses or as
missing-element defenses. For a useful discussion of criminal law defenses generally,
see Paul H. Robinson, CriminalLaw Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
199 (1982). The affirmative defenses have included claims of insanity, duress and the
like, while the missing-element defenses have implicated the voluntary act and mens
rca requirements. See Nemerson, supranote 6, at 419-31. The "loss-of-control" excuse
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tunity to study the criminal law's ideological1 1 functioning. At one
level, it is probably accurate to say that chemically-dependent
offenders regularly have been held criminally responsible for
conduct such as possession of narcotics, despite their claims that
such conduct is the result of a compulsion beyond their control,
because they have failed to convince courts that they are disabled
from engaging in a process of practical reasoning. At a deeper
level, the failure of these exculpatory claims represents a recognition that acceptance of a loss-of-control defense for addicts and

cuts across many of these divides, and has drawn its strength from claims that volition
or free will is essential both to the voluntary act requirement and the mens Yea
requirement present at common law. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTrJR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 349-51 (1972). In addition, the "causal theory" of
excuse, which is premised upon the notion that an actor whose conduct was "caused"
by some nonautonomous force is not criminally responsible, see Moore, supra note 4,
at 1091, has provided a basis for the assertion of an affirmative defense by some
chemically-dependent defendants, see Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable"Actionsand
the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 927, 935-45
(1969). What all of these formulations share, of course, is the basic premise that
conduct that is not the result of the unfettered volition of the defendant is not
culpable. See infra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
" On ideology and legal institutions generally, see Hunt, supra note 7.
The concept of ideology has been employed in a variety of different ways. At one
extreme stands the work of Karl Mannheim, for whom ideology meant the
"characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind," or the
weltanschauungof the subject. KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 49-50 (Louis
Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936). Mannheim suggested that "opinions, statements,
propositions, and systems of ideas ... [should not be] taken at their face value but
... [should be] interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses
them." Id. at 50. At the other extreme lies the work of those who understand
ideology as the complex of ideas that supports and serves the interests of dominant
classes. See generally JOHN B. THOMPSON, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 4
(1984) (arguing for and defending a criticalconception of ideology, in which ideology
is "linked to... the process of maintaining domination).
The concept of ideology employed in this article is close to that set out by
commentator Carol Greenhouse: "[L]egal ideologies and ideologies in general involve
conventionalized invocations of norms and rules that simultaneously suggest and
eliminate competing ideologies by elaborating locally significant categories of
meaning. Ideologies represent strategic claims concerning the nature of normative
orders." Carol J. Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and
Comparisonin the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 687, 689 (1988).
The assertion that there is an ideological function embedded within our criminal
law blaming practices relies heavily upon the view that those practices involve the
manipulation of meaning through language. As one author has explained it:
"Ideology is inscribedinsignifyingpractices-indiscourses, myths, presentations, and representations of the way 'things' 'are-and to this extent it is inscribed in the
language." CATHERINE BELSEY, CRITICAL PRACTICE 42 (1980).
For a fuller discussion of the ideological functioning of the criminal law, see infra
text accompanying notes 124-144.
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alcoholics could fundamentally undermine the system's capacity to
articulate an ideology of individual responsibility.
Perhaps the most elaborate working out of the tension between
intentionalism and determinism as a substantive criminal law matter
occurred in 1973, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, decided United States
v. Moore.1 2 The defendant in this case had appealed his conviction
for possession of heroin on the grounds that, because he was an
addict "with an overpowering need to use heroin," he should not
have been held criminally responsible.1 3 Essentially, Moore's claim
of nonresponsibility was founded upon a deep strain within Western
jurisprudence that holds that conduct is blameworthy only when it
is the product of the actor's free will.1 4 At the same time, Moore's
account of his heroin addiction and its effect on his capacity to
exercise free choice was a specific example of a general determinist
view of human behavior that carries the potential to undermine the
ascription of responsibility whenever a person has acted.15 While
Moore's appeal was unsuccessful, it provoked ajudicial conversation
of uncommon erudition, by a court of national stature, regarding
this fundamental tension within the criminal law.
The Moore opinions are deserving of careful analysis despite the
fact that the case is nearly twenty years old. The insight that such
an analysis yields has a direct bearing on current controversies
16
involving the use of the criminal law to fight a "war on drugs."
12 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).

13 As Judge Wilkey put it: "The gist of appellant's argument here is that the
common law has long held that the capacity to control behavior is a prerequisite for
criminal responsibility." Moore, 486 F.2d at 1145 (citation omitted).
14 See e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 166-67 (1947)
("[O]ur criminal law rests precisely upon the same foundation as does our traditional
ethics: human beings are 'responsible' for their volitional conduct."). As H.L.A. Hart
has expressed the idea: "[A] fundamental principle of morality [is] that a person is not
to be blamed for what he has done if he could not help doing it." H.L.A. HART,
Punishmentand the Eliminationof Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 168, 174 (1968). At an experiential level, this
"principle of responsibility," Moore, supranote 4, at 1111-12, seems almost axiomatic;
it is commonplace for all of us to request and grant excuses as a consequence of
accounts such as, "I couldn't help being late, I was caught in a trafficjam." Michael
Moore has termed this the "causal theory" of excuse. See id.
15 On the problem of determinism's incompatibility with traditional notions of
individual responsibility, see Weinreb, supra note 4, at 57-61.
16 For a helpful discussion of the "war on drugs," seeJohn A. Powell & Eileen B.
Hershenov, Hostageto the Drug War The NationalPurse the Constitution and the Black
Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991); see also U.S. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 1 (1990) [hereinafter
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Despite strong claims on the part of those who have pressed for a
loss-of-control defense that addiction is a disease, the court in the
Moore case, like other courts facing similar claims, refused to create
a new excuse, because to do so would have undermined the criminal
law's capacity to articulate a compelling intentionalist account of
human behavior. That account, in turn, is a central feature of our
normative landscape.
Ironically, although the threat to the ideological functioning of
the criminal law posed by cases like Moore was met squarely and
resolved when posed as a question of substantive doctrine, it has
resurfaced more recently as the operational consequence of efforts
to employ a criminal law enforcement strategy to combat drug and
alcohol abuse. This strategy has resulted in a massive increase in
the volume of cases within the system. 17 Moreover, the vast
majority of these additional drug- and alcohol-related cases involve
defendants drawn from distinct, subordinated populations. 18 The
combination of these two developments has led increasingly to a
new style of adjudication. Currently, in many criminal courts
around the country, the individualized accounts central to an
intentionalist ideology are being replaced by a group-based
orientation that has introduced a new, potentially destructive form
of determinism into the system.
Individualized adjudications make possible the attribution of
responsibility on the basis of a defendant's freely chosen conduct.
Group-based adjudications hold defendants responsible for who
they are rather than for what they have done. Accounts of the first
type are significant moments in the normative life of the community, because they assist us in managing the intentionalist/determinist
tension that inheres in all human behavior. Narratives of the latter
variety also carry important moral weight. Unfortunately, however,
because they tend to convey the message that defendants are

blameworthy due to their racial and class characteristics, these
accounts form the normative basis for the systematic exclusion of
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY] (outlining the "policy of the United States to
disrupt, to dismantle, and ultimately to destroy the illegal market for drugs by
attacking
both the supply and demand sides of the drug problem").
17 See generally Ethan A. Nadelmann, DrugProhibitionin the United States: Costs,
Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 Sc. 939 (1989) (documenting this increase and
arguing for serious consideration of "drug legalization" in light of the proven inability
of the criminal justice system to curtail drug abuse).
18See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 16, at 611.
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whole groups from the social and economic functioning of the
community.
Part I of this article examines formal blaming within the
criminal law as ideological practice.
This form of analysis is
undertaken at length because it provides a vocabulary and a
conceptual framework for the subsequent consideration, in Part II,
of how criminal responsibility is assigned and excuses granted or
denied, and in Part III, of how the criminal justice system ought to
be deployed as a mechanism for social control. The problem of
chemically-dependent offenders is raised throughout the article in
order to create a window through which to view the larger institutional role of the criminal law.
The analysis begins with a description of the lurking tension
between intentionalism and determinism that has long interested
criminal law scholars. To appreciate fully this theoretical conundrum, the article offers one account of the longstanding philosophical debate over the compatibility or incompatibility of free will and
universal causation.
Next, the article sets out the work of one scholar who has sought
to reduce the opposed pull of intentionalism and determinism by
19
arguing for the moral significance of practical reasoning.
Despite the intellectual force of this theory of responsibility, the
article argues that there is an uneasy fit between theoretical views
that urge the predominant moral significance of cognitive activity
on the one hand, and our everyday practice of assigning blame and
granting excuses on the other. The first part concludes by suggesting that it is important to distinguish between theories of responsibility and our everyday experience in making moral attributions
because doing so makes it possible to unmask an essential coexistence of intentionalism and determinism which is otherwise
obscured through the ideological functioning of the criminal law.
Part II of the article then takes up directly the problem of
chemically-dependent offenders. It begins with a close reading of
the various opinions in the Moore case, and examines the shifting
arguments pertaining to volition and excuse presented there.
Competing models of addiction, which correspond in a rough
fashion to competing theories of responsibility more generally, are
then presented in order to illustrate the fundamental incompatibility of medical and legal notions of human behavior.
19 See Moore, supra note 4.
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Essentially, the legal system manages the intentionalism/
determinism conflict by submerging the causal roots of conduct in
a thoroughgoing intentionalist account. The medical profession, on
the other hand, is governed largely by the determinist perspective.
Given this important difference in function and perspective, this
article argues that, once the question is framed in terms of whether
chemically-dependent actors should be excused from criminal
responsibility, the legal system is bound to construct an intentionalist account that holds individual addicts and alcoholics responsible
for their choices.
Part Ill of the article concludes the analysis by suggesting that
a better strategy for those concerned about chemical dependency,
as well as those concerned about preserving the integrity of the
criminal justice system, would be to emphasize the public health
aspects of the addiction problem, thereby placing it within an
institutional setting dominated by a determinist ideology. This
proposal to seek a recharacterization of drug and alcohol addiction
as a medical problem represents a shift in the discussion from
questions of liability to questions of criminalization.
It has become established tradition among criminal law theorists
to separate out the process of defining the scope of the criminal law
(criminalization) from the process of defining the essential characteristics of criminal responsibility (the general part)."0 Among
those who have urged that certain traditionally criminal offenses be
excluded from the criminal code, a series of common arguments has
been raised. These arguments go beyond a consideration of
individual defendants' blameworthiness-which is deemed to be
relevant to questions of responsibility rather than criminalizationand instead focus on problems with respect to enforcement,
21
discrimination, misallocation of resources, and system legitimacy.
This article will show that the current policy of relying upon
criminal law enforcement as the primary means for dealing with
substance abuse has been largely ineffective. Moreover, the costs to

20 See e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 393 ("[T]he quest of Western legal theory
for the last hundred years or so has been the cultivation of a general part of the
criminal law. The general part goes beyond the particular offenses and even
particular patterns of liability.. . ."). On the question of criminalization, see HERBERT
L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); Sanford H. Kadish, The

Crisis of Overcriminaiization,374

ANNALS 157 (1967).

21 For a critique of this sort of analysis, see John M. Junker, Criminalizationand
Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 697 (1972).
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the criminal justice system and to its constructional22 role have
been enormous. As a matter of theory and as a matter of concrete
necessity, the time has come to recognize the limitations of a policy
of criminal enforcement. In the short run, a revised policy of
partial decriminalization will serve the interests of those suffering
from drug and alcohol addiction, as well as those who are indirect
victims of this complex societal problem. In the long run, renewed
attention to the matter of criminalization may well be necessary for
the preservation of the criminal law as an effective ideological
institution.
I.

INTENTIONALISM AND DETERMINISM

Efforts to understand the relationship between free will and
determinism for purposes of figuring an actor's moral responsibility
have preoccupied a diverse group of thinkers from Plato and St.
Augustine to Martin Luther and David Hume. 23 In this century,
philosophers of the mind have conducted an especially vigorous
debate on the question of whether a principle of responsibility that
requires freedom of the will can be understood as compatible with
notions of determinism.
In important respects, the debate can be framed as a definitional
dispute centering on the term "freedom." Traditionally, an actor
has been said to have acted freely (according to his or her free will)
if, with respect to a given act, he or she could have done otherwise. 2 4 This traditional formulation has been challenged, however,
by the use of a fairly standard set of hypotheticals designed to show
that freedom of action may exist without freedom of choice and
freedom of choice may exist without freedom of action. Thus, a
person could determine to raise his or her arm, yet be incapable of
translating that desire or choice into conduct because of physical
paralysis or the application of a greater contrary physical force by
others who wish the bodily movement not to occur. 25 Conversely,

See supra note 7.
23 See PLATO, PHAEDRUS (Walter Hamilton trans., 1973); SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE
CITY OF GOD 156-58 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950); MARTIN LUTHER, On the Bondage of
2

the Will, in LUTHER AND ERASMUS: FREE WILL AND SALVATION 101 (E. Gordon Rupp

& Philip S. Watson trans. & eds., 1969); DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 91 (Charles W. Hendel ed., 1955).
24 See John M. Fischer, Introduction: Responsibility and Freedom, in MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 9, 41 (John M. Fischer ed., 1986). The same analysis applies as well
to omissions.
25 See id. at 45.

1992] CONSTRUCTIONOFRESPONSIBILITYIN CRIMINAL LAW

2255

a person could be fully capable, in the physical sense, of boarding
an airplane, yet be incapable of so doing because of an overwhelm26
ing fear of flying.
Given that the "freedom to do otherwise" can be understood to
include both the freedom to choose from among competing courses
of conduct and the freedom to translate that determination into
action, some writers have argued that both senses of freedom are
27
required before an ascription of responsibility can be made.
Others have suggested that freedom of action alone is a sufficient
basis for responsibility even if the actor's choice is in some respects
determined or caused. These philosophers, most notably represented by David Hume and his intellectual heirs, have argued that the
freedom that is morally significant is the freedom to act according
to "one's own desires, . . . those which have their origin in the
regularity of one's character .... "2' According to this school, an
actor is subject to praise or blame for his or her conduct to the
extent that it "reflects on the sort of person he [or she] is," without
29
regard for how he or she got that way.
Proponents of this view draw a critical distinction between
"prescriptive" and "descriptive" versions of the determinist account.
Both versions define determinism as the thesis that past events
combine with the laws of nature to determine, or cause, a unique
future.30 The descriptive version favored by Humean writers such
as Moritz Schlick, however, denies that such laws "compel" human
behavior in any morally significant sense; rather, it is argued, they
merely describe how that behavior comes about. This distinction
between the prescriptive form of determinism (compulsion) and the
descriptive variety (causation) is important because it makes it
possible to hold human actors responsible for their conduct without
regard to whether their choices were caused by factors beyond their
26 See id. at 17.
27
See, e.g., C.A. Campbell, Is "Freewill" a Pseudo-Problem?, in FREE WILL AND
DETERMINISM,
supra note 9, at 112, 125.
28
Moritz Schlick, When Is A Man Responsible?, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM,
supra note 9, at 54, 62; see also HUME, supra note 23, at 107 ("Actions are, by their
very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause
in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither
redound to his honor if good, nor infamy if evil.").
29 George Vuoso, Note, Background,Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661,
1673 (1987).
3o See Peter Van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of Responsibility and Determinism, in
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 24, at 241, 242.
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control.3 1
For purposes of figuring moral responsibility, the
relevant question is whether an actor is the author of his or her own
conduct such that his or her choices fairly can be attributed to his
or her ongoing character. The arguably separate question of how
the actor came to acquire such a character is said simply to be
s2
beside the point.
Critics of the Humean approach argue that its definition of
freedom is incompatible with the central requirement of moral
responsibility: that the person could have acted otherwise than he
or she did. 3 This critique is significant because it implicates what
one writer has called the "principle of transfer of powerlessness,"
which holds that "if you cannot prevent one thing, and you cannot
prevent that thing's leading to another, you cannot prevent the
other."3 4 Acceptance of this principle undermines the Humean
character-based approach to responsibility because the determined
nature of human choice must also render unfree the conduct to
which unfree choices lead. As John Hospers has put it: "How can
anyone be responsible for his actions, since they grow out of his
character, which is shaped and molded and made what it is by
influences-some hereditary, but most of them stemming from early
parental environment-that were not of his own making or choos35
ing?"
A. Individual Responsibility and the Process of Reflection
A more thorough reworking of the principle of responsibility
has been offered by another group of philosophers, who construct
elaborate schemata of the human decision-making process in order
to provide a more detailed defense of attributing determined
choices to the person of the agent when assigning praise and blame.
A feature common to most of these accounts is that they distinguish
between the instinctive or motivational components of the decisionmaking process on the one hand, and the reflective or valuational
s6
elements on the other.
31

See Schlick, supra note 28, at 57-61.

32 See Vuoso, supra note 29, at 1681.

33 See Campbell, supra note 27, at 113. A Humean might respond that an actor
can act otherwise, if he or she chooses, but that it is a separate question whether he
or she has the ability to so choose. See e.g., Schlick, supra note 28, at 62-63
(analyzing the "consciousness of responsibility").
34 Fischer, supra note 24, at 19.
35 Hospers, supra note 9, at 32.
36 Or, to state the distinction differently, between desiring and preferring.
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A classic statement of this distinction was offered some years
ago by Harry Frankfurt, who argued as follows: (1) Human beings,
like most other animals, have desires and motives, and are able to
37
make choices that frequently satisfy these "first-order desires."
(2) Human beings also have the capacity to form "second-order
desires," or preferences among their first-order desires. Thus, a
person who is addicted to drugs may have competing first-order
desires to ingest the addictive substance and to refrain from so
doing. In addition, says Frankfurt, he or she may have a secondorder desire that favors abstinence over ingestion. 38 (3) The
characteristic that distinguishes persons from nonpersons is that
persons frequently are able to make their second-order desires the
basis upon which they wish to be moved to action. In Frankfurt's
terminology, the essential attribute of personhood is the presence
of these "second-order volitions," which occur when the individual
"wants... certain desire[s] to be his will."3 9 Thus, with respect to
the hypothetical addict, if he or she has the capacity to prefer the
desire to abstain over the competing desire to ingest, and if this

preference is the addict's "will" (if he or she wishes to act in
conformity with this second-order preference), then, even if he or
she is unable to resist the first-order desire to ingest, he or she is
(4)
still possessed of the essential attribute of personhood.
"Freedom of the will" exists when a person is able to form a secondorder volition as to any of his or her first-order desires. 4° (5)
Moral responsibility does not require freedom of the will; rather, all
that is required is the ability to "act freely," or the ability to act
41
according to one's second-order volition.
Interestingly, Frankfurt makes no claim with respect to the
moral content (as opposed to the moral significance) of secondorder volitional processes. While he asserts that the chief characteristic of persons, as opposed to objects, animals, and "wantons," is
-7 See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedomof the Will and the Conceptof a Person, in MORAL
RESPONSIBILrTY, supra note 24, at 65, 66-67. Thus, when a person is thirsty, he or she
can decide to drink some water.
38 See id. at 70-72. A person may also have desires of the third, fourth, or n-th
order. See id. at 76.

39 Id. at 70. "The essential characteristic of a wanton [a nonperson] is that he
does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its
being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers
to be moved by other desires." Id. at 71.
40 Frankfurt calls this the freedom "to will what [one] wants to will, or to have the
will [one] wants." Id. at 75.
41 See id. at 78-79.
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the capacity for self-reflection, 42 he does not draw an essential
equivalence between reflection and valuation. He describes secondorder volitions as integrated preferences relating to competing firstorder desires, but he refuses to take the additional step of claiming
that those preferences necessarily result from a particular "moral
stance" assumed by the individual.43
Gary Watson has offered an alternative version of Frankfurt's
44
model which does distinguish between "wanting" and "valuing."
Like Frankfurt, Watson seeks to construct an analytic scheme that
identifies the particular variety of "freedom" upon which he believes
responsibility ought to rest. Where the two writers part is in their
description of the reflective activity by which preferences are
formed. Watson's claim is that "the rational part of the soul itself
determines what has value and how much, and thus is responsible
for the original ranking of alternative states of affairs." 45 In
Watson's schema, an actor's responsibility turns on the interplay
between his or her "motivational system" (the set of passions,
instincts, and desires which incline an agent toward or away from
some course of action) and "valuational system" ("that set of
considerations which... yields judgments of the form: the thing
for me to do in these circumstances, all things considered, is a"). 46
The problem of assigning moral responsibility under Watson's
analysis arises because what an agent desires may be different from
that which he or she values, and that which he or she values most
may be other than what he or she ultimately is moved to seek.47
The relative influence on one's behavior of his or her motivational
system versus his or her valuational system presumably varies from
one decisional moment to the next. Watson argues that conduct
that is governed entirely by desire or emotion, and which is
"radically independent of the evaluative systems of... agents," is
unfree because it is of a "compulsive character"; thus, in his view,
42 See id. at 67.

43 "It may not be from the point of view of morality that the person evaluates his
first-order desires." Id. at 73 n.6.
44 See Gary Watson, Free Agency, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 24, at 81,

82.

45 Id. at 84. Watson attributes this idea to Plato.
46
Id. at 91.

Id.

47 See id. at 85. Watson does concede the fairly obvious point that valuations
influence desires, see id. at 84, and that desires influence valuations, see id. at 89. All
the same, he seems correct in asserting that the two diverge from time to time, and
that these instances are the ones in which assignments of responsibility are most
difficult.
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the conduct of "'kleptomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, and the like'" should
48
not result in the ascription of responsibility.
In the more typical case, however, human beings are said to be
"more or less free agents," depending upon the degree of divergence between their appetites or passions and their valuational
judgments. As the divergence between an actor's wants and values
grows (with respect to a given instance of conduct), responsibility
49
lessens; as the two systems converge, responsibility increases.
What Frankfurt and Watson are after, of course, is a conception
of responsibility that can be made compatible with the determinists'
account of human behavior. 50 The ascription of responsibility to
an individual actor is analytically difficult because desert is understood as personal; there must be some attribute unique to an actor
that renders him or her an appropriate subject for praise or
blame.5 1 If one focuses on the determined nature of choices and
actions, the requisite personal autonomy may be undermined
because the matrix of causal factors that determine an agent's
conduct is likely to include elements external to his or her autonomous self. If, on the other hand, one focuses on internal reflective
processes, which go to define the very essence of a person, a
satisfactory foundation for desert may be said to exist.
In light of this distinction, Frankfurt and Watson attempt a
revision of the responsibility principle traditionally relied upon by
causal theorists. Both focus their analyses upon the reflective
component of the decision-making process, thereby separating that
component from the instinctive or motivational roots of behavior.52 If the capacity to reflect upon or evaluate one's own desires
48

Id. at 96. It is worth noting the strong link between this point and Michael

Moore's notion that some excuses are granted because the actor was denied the
opportunity to engage in practical reasoning. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying
text.
49 See Watson, supra note 44, at 95-96.
" Watson characterizes the project as one of setting out a conception of freedom
that makes the determinists' account irrelevant. See id. at 82.
51 Cf. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 56-57 ("Unless the capacity to determine one's
action is not merely individual but personal in a strong, constitutive sense, an
attribution on the basis of how the capacity is exercised seems altogether arbitrary;
for the attribution attaches to a particular person and not simply to a person or to

anyperson.").
Cf.JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
169-72, 170 (1883) ("The man"who controls himself refers to distant motives and
general principles of conduct, and directs his conduct accordingly. The man who
does not control himself is guided by the motives which immediately press upon his
attention.").
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is to be understood as a sufficient condition for the ascription of
responsibility, however, such an ability must somehow be invested
with a special moral significance. Frankfurt and Watson recognize
this requirement, and both make claims aimed at satisfying it.
In Frankfurt's schema, the morally significant moment within
the decision-making process occurs when the actor forms a volition
of the second order or higher. For Frankfurt, the formation of such
a volition signifies that the actor has "identifie[d] himself decisively
with one of his first-order desires, [such that] this commitment
'resounds' throughout the potentially endless array of higher
53
orders."
The claim implicit in Watson's work, by contrast, is that actors
who produce conduct through the agency of an engaged valuational
system "own" their choices in a true and morally significant fashion,
precisely because the content of their reflective work is normative
(valuations by reference to a set of norms that are internal and
unique to the actor). In Watson's emendation of Frankfurt's
scheme, the uniquely personal characteristic of the human self
within the decisional process is identified as that mass of attitudes
54
and values that provides reasons for one's actions.
The difference between these two approaches may be less
important than the feature they share in common. As we have seen,
s Frankfurt, supra note 37, at 76. Although the actor may not be possessed of the
freedom to will otherwise, he or she is deemed to be responsible for behavior
animated by this volition, because he or she has made this particular desire his or her
"own." See id.
Watson criticizes this aspect of Frankfurt's theory on the ground that nothing
within his analysis explains why a particular want can have "the special property of
being peculiarly... [the actor's] 'own.'" Watson, supra note 44, at 94. This criticism
seems compelling, given that the significance that Frankfurt attaches to the formation
of a volition of the second order or higher appears to be a matter of definition rather
than analysis.
54 At times Watson describes this value-driven reasoning process as "an original
spring of action." See e.g., Watson, supra note 44, at 84. Humans are not free agents,
he says, in the sense that God is, because, by definition, God's desires and evaluative
preferences are always the same. Nevertheless, to the extent that people share with
God the capacity to form preferences based upon a process of valuation, they possess
a kind of autonomy or freedom which is unavailable to "the Brutes," and which is a
sufficient moral basis upon which to attach responsibility. See id. at 96.
The opportunity and capacity for practical reasoning, which are central to
Moore's revised theory of responsibility, also play an important role in Frankfurt and
Watson's schemas. Nevertheless, while Frankfurt and Watson both understand
practical reasoning to be a necessary condition for self-reflective activity, neither of
them understands it as a sufficient condition. See Frankfurt, supra note 37, at 71;
Watson, supra note 44, at 85.
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the difficulty facing the causal theorist is that traditional principles
of responsibility seem incompatible with the fairly plausible notion
of universal causation. Some writers, in order to avoid the unhappy
conclusion that a universal excuse exists, continue to insist that
human choices and/or actions can be contra-causal.5 5 Frankfurt
and Watson, on the other hand, operate within an alternative
philosophical tradition in which the relevant question is not whether
conduct is caused, but rather whether the matrix of causation
producing a given act includes some process of reflection or
valuation that is internal to the agent. The premise that an agent
"owns" his or her internal mental process renders the problem of
universal causation irrelevant, as a conceptual matter, to the
question of moral responsibility for conduct, because the freedom
required under this alternative principle of responsibility is defined
simply as the freedom to engage in self-reflective activity.
Significantly, given their definition of the problem, Frankfurt
and Watson need not deny the truth of the principle of transfer of
powerlessness.- 6 Instead, they argue, albeit in slightly different
terms, that behavior that is the product of an unbroken chain of
prior causes is still attributable to the person of the human actor, so
57
long as the filter of an autonomous mental process is in place.
This choice between competing versions of the responsibility
principle, and competing notions of individual autonomy, is not
capable of a final and conclusive resolution through the application
of scientific proofs. A number of libertarian writers have recognized the limited capacity of objective analysis to settle the question
of the existence of a contra-causal freedom of the will, and have
appealed to their readers to resolve the question for themselves,
58
based upon their own moral experience.

55 Claims of this sort are advanced in Campbell, supra note 27, at 113; Roderick
M. Chisholm, The Agent As Cause, in AcTION THEORY 199 (Myles Brand & Douglas
Walton eds., 1976); Roderick M. Chisholm, Freedom and Action, in FREEDOM AND
DETERMINISM 11 (Keith Lehrer ed., 1966).
56 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
57
See Frankfurt, supra note 37, at 77-80; Watson, supra note 44, at 95-96; see also
Bernard Gert & Timothy J. Duggan, Free Will as the Ability to Will, in MORAL
RESPONSlBILITY,supra note 24, at 205,206-07,213 (arguing that the question whether
a person has free will is "best viewed as a question about whether he has a certain
power (... ability) not ... whether what a man willed to do was the result of
coercion").
M As C.A. Campbell has stated:
Certainly "logical analysis" per se will not do. That has a function, but a
function that can only be ancillary. For what we are seeking to know is the
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In a similar fashion, the claims of the Humeans regarding
character, as well as those of Frankfurt and Watson with respect to
self-evauative mental process, are immune from measurement,
objective study, or proof. To be sure, Frankfurt and Watson do
attempt to convince their readers that it is the presence of reflective
mental activity that distinguishes human decision makers from
objects and other animals. As noted above, however, Frankfurt does
little more than describe this uniquely human mental process and
postulate its moral significance, while Watson relies on Platonic
59
notions of the soul to carry his argument.
B. PraisingAnd Blaming As Social Practice
One need not leave the matter to competing postulates, as it
may be possible to gain some understanding of the qualities that
make human actors responsible moral agents by investigating the
social practices that form the context for shared ideas about
blaming and praising.
Much of the work which has been undertaken concerning
responsibility and desert can be located within the tradition of
liberal individualism, in which human agents are presented as "presocial" beings endowed with a rationality and autonomy independent from, though perhaps reflected in, the operation of social
practice. 6° The traditional responsibility principle, which requires
freedom of the will, ordinarily is treated within the confines of this
liberal ideology. 6 1 So too, the compatibilist alternatives, while
recognizing the determined nature of human choices and actions,

meaning of the expression "could have acted otherwise" not in the abstract,
but in the context of the question of man's moral responsibility ....
.We ought to place ourselves imaginatively at the standpoint of the
agent engaged in the typical moral situation in which free will is claimed,
and ask ourselves whether from this standpoint the claim in question does
or does not have meaning for us.
Campbell, supra note 27, at 126, 132.
5 See Frankfurt, supra note 37, at 66-67, 74-76; Watson, supra note 44, at 83-86.
60 See NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLrICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY
VALUES 144-46 (1988). Among the more influential contributions to the development
of this liberal tradition isJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett

ed., 1967).
6' See Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, CriminalLaw, and the Ideology of Individuality,
77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 1005-06 (1986); see also HART, supra note 14, at
11-13, 18-22 (noting how liberal ideology establishes the idea that criminal
punishment is solely for those who voluntarily break the law).
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share a presumption that the qualities which render a human actor
responsible somehow reside outside the ambit of social pro62
cess.

A competing school of thought has developed, however, that
urges a consideration of collective social activity as a means of
understanding common notions of individualism and individual
responsibility. These communitarian critics of liberalism argue that
humans are "to a large extent social and socially constructed
beings," whose "very 'personhood' is influenced by the kind of
society in which they live." 63 Ultimately, the notion of individual
autonomy that renders humans fit subjects for what P.F. Strawson
has called the "reactive attitudes" 64 must be understood in these
socially-contextualized terms. Human autonomy exists because it is
a social necessity and because people share the subjective experience of its operation, not because it can be shown to exist as some
65
sort of pre-social reality.
62

See Michael D. Bayles, Character,Purpose, and CriminalResponsibility, 1 LAW &
PHIL. 5, 7 (1982); LACEY, supra note 60, at 65-68.
63 LACEY, supra note 60, at 144-45. Frank Alexander has suggested that
contemporaryjurisprudence generally is burdened by three "fallacies," one of which,
the "ontological" fallacy, involves "the neglect of community as an essential source of
meaning for life together." Frank S. Alexander, Three Fallacies of Contemporaty
Jurisprudence, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985). Alexander goes on to argue that,
"[w]hat is missing from contemporaryjurisprudence is the possibility that the nature
of being is relational rather than individual." Id. at 26. For other versions of
communitarian theory, see ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN
NATURE 27-48 (1983); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187210 (1985); ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcS 29-144 (1975).
64 STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM, supra note 2, at 38.
65 For a good discussion of the "invented" nature of both group consciousness and
individual autonomy, see Joseph S. Roucek, SOCIAL CONTROL FOR THE 1980S: A
HANDBOOK FOR ORDER IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY ix (Joseph S. Roucek ed., 1978)
[hereinafter SOCIAL CONTROL]. On the issue of self consciousness and social practice,
see UNGER, supra note 63, at 191-235.
Austin Sarat has observed that "consciousness and ideology" are terms that:
embed the study of ideas in social structure and social relations. They draw
attention to the way similarly situated persons come to see the world in
similar ways. They suggest that subjectivity is not free floating and
autonomous but is, instead, constituted, in a historically contingent manner,
by the very objects of consciousness.
Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over'." Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness
of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALEJ. L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 n.1 (1990). This set of ideas is
characteristic of those whose work grows out of the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. As
Robert Gordon has put it: "The way human beings experience the world is by
collectively building and maintaining systems of shared meanings that make it
possible for us to interpret one another's words and actions." Robert W. Gordon,
New Developments in Legal Theoly, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281,287 (David Kairys ed.,
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Further complicating the matter is the fact that social practices
relating to the attribution of responsibility involve multiple
perspectives. As Professor Strawson has persuasively shown, people
regularly see themselves and others from two competing vantage

points: the "participant" and the "objective."'
Employing the
participant perspective, people unproblematically assign praise and
blame to their own acts and the conduct of others, because they
understand human agents as autonomous decision makers. At other
times, through the lens of the objective standpoint, they refuse to
ascribe responsibility, recognizing the nonautonomous history and
67
circumstance which go to make up the determinist account.
In theory, both of these perspectives ought to be available for
every instance of human activity. In practice, our experience tells
us that only one perspective can operate at any given moment, if
specific questions of responsibility and desert are to be resolved in
6
a coherent fashion. 8
1. Theory Versus Practice
Ordinarily, the criminal law adopts Strawson's participant
perspective when evaluating the responsibility of a given defendant;
and yet, at times, the law recognizes excuses clearly animated by the
objective viewpoint. The work of some contemporary criminal law
theorists, by applying the thinking of Humean and Frankfurtean
1982). For an interesting attempt to reconfigure the relationship between absolute
certainty and culture, see Joan C. Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal History and
the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REv. 713 (1990).
66 STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM, supranote 2, at 38; Strawson, Freedom
and Resentment, supra note 2, at 1-25. In rough terms, the "participant" perspective
is equivalent to the intentionalist perspective defined earlier. Similarly, the
"objective" perspective corresponds to the determinist perspective. See supra notes
1 & 63.
7 See Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, supra note 2, at 6-13.
68 Strawson notes the "tension" that exists between these two perspectives. See id.
at 10. This sort of tension has also been a theme in the work of Thomas Nagel. See
THoMAs NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 124 (1986).
Just as our world contains opposing views of human personality, so, too, we are
constantly confronted with contesting notions of time. In Carol Greenhouse's
fascinating study of the legal system's role in mediating such notions, she suggests
that "the reformulation of time can be achieved only if the crucial differences among
time's forms can be effectively suppressed." Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time:
Temporality and the CulturalLegitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1637 (1989). Just
so, the argument here is that a reformulation of individual autonomy can be achieved
only if the crucial differences between the intentionalist and determinist perspectives
can be effectively suppressed.
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philosophers to questions of criminal responsibility and excuse, has
helped to elucidate the operation of this shifting perspective. For
example, in his article Causation and the Excuses, 6 9 Michael Moore
argues that causal theories of excuse 70 should be rejected because
they fail to account accurately for excuse doctrine as it exists within
the criminal law, 71 and because they fail to provide a sound

69 See supra note 4.
70 Moore describes the causal theory of excuse as follows:
[W]hen an agent is caused to act by a factor outside his control, he is
excused; only those acts not caused by some factor external to his will are
unexcused. The normative part of the theory asserts that the criminal law
is morally right in excusing all those, and only those, whose actions are
caused by factors outside their control.
Id. at 1091.
71 With respect to this claim, Moore examines abroad range of defenses founded
upon factors such as compulsion, mental disability, and infancy in order to show that
an impaired or underdeveloped capacity for "practical reasoning" rather than the
simple absence of volition better explains the law's willingness to excuse certain
conduct in particular circumstances. See Moore, supra note 4, at 1101-11. The causal
theorist might argue, for example, that a defendant who has acted in response to
another's threats of death or serious bodily injury is entitled under the law to a duress
excuse upon a showing that his or her will was overborne, because the moving force
behind the action (the true actor) is the third-party coercer rather than the defendant
himself or herself. See id. at 1102 (citing as an example of this kind of reasoning the
English case of Regina v. Hudson, 2 All E.R. 244, 246 (1971)). Moore responds that
a better explanation of this established criminal law excuse is to be found in the fact
that external threats by a third party exculpate a defendant only when there is
sufficient evidence that the coercion disrupted the defendant's ability to weigh
options and freely choose a course of action. This description, says Moore, is a
superior theoretical formulation because it more fully accounts for all of the doctrinal
features of the excuse of duress, including the usual requirement that the external
threat be one that a "'person of reasonable firmness' would not have been able to
resist." Id. at 1132 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962)).
Turning his attention to the insanity defense, Moore acknowledges that some
elements within this area of law show the influence of a causality-centered principle
of responsibility. He points out that the Brawner formulation set forth in United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rests upon an inquiry into the causal
relationship between mental illness and criminal conduct, and he allows that all of the
recognized insanity tests require a causal link between mental disease or defect and
the conduct for which an excuse is sought. See Moore, supra note 4, at 1109.
Nevertheless, Moore argues that "[i]t is not because crazy people are caused to do
what they do that they are excused; rather, crazy people are excused because they are
crazy." Id. at 1137. What he means by this, of course, is that actors who are relieved
of criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect avoid the ascription of
responsibility not because their illness has forced them to pull a trigger or wield a
knife (which would be the equivalent of some sort of internal third-party coercer), but
because their illness is understood as having clouded their thought processes and
disrupted their ability to engage in practical reasoning. In essence, Moore's claim
here, as elsewhere, is that the law provides an excuse in this category of cases because
impaired practical reasoning ability has rendered these actors other than responsible
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normative basis for blaming practices in general.7 2 In the place of
a causal theory, Moore offers an account in which the role of
practical reasoning is central to determining the proper relationship
between intentionalist and determinist perspectives in the figuring
of criminal responsibility.
Moore's thesis is that a causal theory of excuse cannot be
reconciled as a matter of logic with the reality of determinism. The
idea is presented as an argument reductio ad absurdum. First, Moore
sets out the "determinist premise," that all human conduct is the
product of causal forces beyond the actor's control. Second, he
identifies what he terms "the moral version of the causal theory of
excuse." This moral claim, which is a natural corollary of the
principle of responsibility, requires that blame be withheld when
conduct is caused by factors outside of the scope of an actor's free
will. Next, Moore states a theory of punishment under which moral
culpability is a necessary condition for legal liability. Finally, Moore

concludes that the three preceding steps yield a "universal legal
73
excuse"-no conduct can ever be legally punishable.
Of course, says Moore, we can avoid this absurd conclusion if we
are willing to give up one of the premises upon which it rests. The
most obvious candidate would seem to be the assertion of determinism, and Moore toys with that solution before concluding that such
a course would require a metaphysics that is "implausible." 74 The
remaining choices are either to relinquish any normative basis for
our blaming practices or to give up the causal theory of excuse.
Moore opts to focus upon the latter possibility. His claim is that
one must look beyond simple causal accounts in order to identify
those features that make human actors responsible moral agents.
In essence, he asserts that it is the opportunity and ability to engage
in practical reasoning that, in the ordinary case, renders one subject
moral agents. See id. at 1138-39.
Finally, as regards the excuse of infancy, Moore rejects in short order the causal
account that infants generally are not held responsible for otherwise criminal conduct
because they are not possessed of volition. It is difficult, explains Moore, to accept
the conclusion that minors, as a group, are always coerced in their conduct; rather,
it is far more descriptive of established doctrine to say that an absence of experience
and autonomy make it difficult for children to consider alternatives, develop criteria
for decision, and act according to some rational calculation of costs and benefits. See
id. at 1111.
72 See id. at 1111-12, 1139-48.
73Id. at 1113.
74 Id. at 1112.
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to blame and praise, punishment and reward. 75 Nevertheless, his
claim that a causal theory of excuse is inadequate to explain how the
system comes to adopt one or the other viewpoint, and his concomitant assertion that the capacity and opportunity to engage in
practical reasoning are determinative, are as immune from scientific
proof and conclusive logical analysis as are the claims of his
76
philosophical forerunners.
Recognizing this, Moore allows that his version of the responsibility principle must be established by reference to "the totality of
our moral experience involving praise and blame." 77 He argues
that people regularly assign praise and blame to conduct known to
have been caused by forces beyond the control of the actor, 78 and
he identifies other instances, in which responsibility is withheld,79in
terms which make the role of practical reasoning predominant.
All the same, Moore is left with a number of cases, which he

describes as "a very isolated class of moral experience,"80 in which
the causal theory does seem to be the best explanation for our
strong exculpatory impulses. In particular, Moore is forced to
account for the sympathy many people feel toward offenders whose
behavior is the result of what Richard Delgado has called a "rotten
social background."8 l
With respect to these "atypical" cases,

75 See id. at 1136, 1139-49.
76 At least one commentator in this area has made the claim that logical analysis

alone is sufficient to settle the question. "The argument against libertarianism that
is based on our moral experience will simply degenerate into an argument about what
our moral experience is or should be. The more definitive argument against it is a
purely conceptual one, which demonstrates that libertarianism is an incoherent
position." Vuoso, supra note 29, at 1669. While it may be true that libertarianism is
conceptually "incoherent," it is also the case that claims made by this commentator
with respect to the central role of "character" in figuring an actor's responsibility are
also incoherent, at least insofar as the principle of transfer of powerlessness is
concerned. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. At root, conceptual analysis
will carry the argument only to the extent that basic assumptions about human
nature, premised upon moral experience, are shared by writer and reader alike.
77 Moore, supra note 4, at 1144.
78 "Our moral life is built upon our praising or blaming people when they help
a friend, tell a bad joke, create a work of art, or write a clear and truthful essay about
the excuses-even though we know at least some of the factors that caused these
actions." Id. at 1144-45.
79 See id. at 1127-39.
80 Id. at 1145.
81 Id. The merits of the "rotten social background" defense were the subject of
a spirited exchange between judge David Bazelon and Professor Stephen Morse. See
David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the CriminalLaw, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385 (1976);
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976); see also Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background': Should
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Moore abandons his reliance on everyday moral experience and
claims that the sympathy we feel toward socially deprived offenders,
like the optical illusion of a straight stick appearing bent when
immersed in water, is a distortion of the true principle of responsi82
bility.
A closer examination of the data left unexplained by Moore's
theory is warranted, as it provides an important insight into the
relationship between our formal blaming practices and our common
understanding of human nature. Presumably, Moore would agree
with Strawson that, when evaluating the conduct of human actors,
we must choose between the participant and objective viewpoints.
The import of Moore's analysis seems to be that the choice is
absolute: if the actor was possessed of the opportunity and capacity
for practical reasoning, then he or she was a responsible agent; if
the actor was denied the opportunity to reason or was incapable of
so doing, then responsibility may not be assigned.
Under this analysis, if offenders with "rotten social backgrounds" meet the criteria for responsibility (which in Moore's
terms they do), the feelings of sympathy which many people
experience must be explained away-or "discount[ed] "8 --as being
the result of improper factors. Thus, Moore suggests that such
sympathy is suspect because it is asymmetrical: people rarely feel
sympathy for offenders whose conduct was caused by a privileged
upbringing. 84 In addition, he argues that our impulse toward an
exculpatory response in these cases results from a false psychology
perhaps derived from hidden feelings of self-loathing or guilt.
Finally, he asserts that this sort of sympathy is elitist and morally
suspect, because the refusal to judge others means we think them
morally less significant than ourselves, reducing the other to
85
something less than a full human being.
There is much that is compelling about Moore's analysis of the
proposed "rotten social background" defense. Nevertheless, he
the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe EnvironmentalDeprivation?, 3 LAW &
INEQ.J. 9 (1985).
82 See Moore, supra note 4, at 1145-46.
83 Id. at 1146.47.
84 But see Clarence S. Darrow, ClosingArgumentForThe Defense In The Leopold-Loeb
Murder Trial, in FAMOUS AMERICANJURY SPEECHES 992 (Frederick C. Hicks ed., Fred
B. Rothman & Co. 1990)(1925).
85 See Moore, supra note 4, at 1146-47. For a similar view of the relationship
between responsibility and respect for others as persons, see Herbert Morris, Persons
and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 76 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971).

1992] CONSTRUCTIONOFRESPONSIBILITYIN CRIMINAL LAW

2269

ought not be allowed to deny so easily that portion of our experi-

ence that fails to comport with his revised principle of responsibility. His assertion that "the causal theorist's interpretation of the
principle of responsibility is inconsistent with the mass of our
judgments about where it is just to praise and blame," s6 may be
correct as an empirical matter,8 7 but, at a deeper level, his
account fails to accomplish all that he wishes for it. Just as it would
be impossible to develop a permanent objectivity of viewpoint on
the strength of the determinist claim alone, because theoretical
conviction with respect to the caused nature of conduct simply is
inadequate to extinguish our ongoing experience as members of a
community in which the reactive attitudes are employed as "part of
the general framework of human life,"88 so too, it is unrealistic to
expect that a tight and elegant theory of responsibility based upon
the operation of practical reasoning can render irrelevant our deep
89
contrary instincts, whatever their origins may be.
2. Dualism
An alternative analysis of this class of cases, which does not
require that prevalent feelings of sympathy be consigned to the
category of the extraneous, is to understand the offender with a
"rotten social background" as simultaneously responsible and not
responsible, because he or she is simultaneously free and not free
to act autonomously. In some essential respect, we understand that
these actors could not have "done otherwise," given the extreme
86 Moore, supra note 4, at 1147.
87 Weinreb, however,

disagrees with Moore on -this point, asserting that

"[piervasively throughout other areas of our experience a causal explanation does
count as sufficient." Weinreb, supra note 4, at 60 n.27.
88 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, supra note 2, at 13.
89 Kelman's view is that "people simply oscillate uncomfortably between
intentionalist and determinist accounts, with no discernible metaprinciple to discover
which is appropriate to particular situations." KELMAN, GUIDE TO CLS, supranote 1,
at 90-91. He asserts further that it is a "seriously wrongheaded assumption" to
believe that "logical consistency" rather than "deeply felt" instincts governs our
blaming and praising practices. Id. at 318 n.12. Strawson puts the idea this way:
[I]n philosophy, though it also is a theoretical study, we have to take
account of the facts in all their bearings; we are not to suppose that we are
required, or permitted, as philosophers, to regard ourselves, as human
beings, as detached from the attitudes which, as scientists, we study with
detachment.
Strawson, Freedom andResentmen supra note 2, at 25; cf. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez
and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1777-79 (1987) (arguing for the inherent
separateness of theory and practice).
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social deprivation which has shaped their decision-making process.
At the same time, we hold them responsible for their actions
because we believe that they have exercised choice and have
directed their conduct according to formed preferences. The
critical fact about this alternative understanding is that both the
determinist and intentionalist descriptions of the offender's conduct
90
are in some fashion true.
Moore rejects this alternative as predicated on an illegitimate
sort of "linguistic dualism," 91 a failure to recognize that behind the
words "could not have done otherwise" lie two quite distinct
concepts, one of which is relevant to the assignment of criminal
responsibility and one of which is not. Moore's argument proceeds
in two steps: First, he argues that, in general, the tradition of
"ordinary-language" philosophy upon which the dualist approach
rests is theoretically unsound, at least where established social
practice is at odds with new scientific insight.92 Then he suggests
that, in particular, dualism is flawed when applied to the question
of free will and determinism, because the barrier that demarcates
the two coexisting truths must be crossed in cases in which an
excuse is granted. 9
With respect to the first of these two points, Moore makes the
following argument:

90 If this dualist analysis holds for the offender who is the product of a "rotten
social background," it should obviously apply with equal if not greater force to one
who is chemically dependent. A uniquely strong foundation has been laid for the
application of the objective viewpoint in such cases by the prevailing medical model
of chemical dependency. This model typically includes genetic and biochemical
factors within the causal matrix alongside environmental determinants of conduct.
As will be discussed below, causal explanations that claim a physical as well as a
psychological component tend to be privileged in our excuse-granting practices. See
infra notes 233-33 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is worth noting that, although
efforts to establish a loss-of-control excuse like the one pressed in the Moore case have
so far been unsuccessful, the medical model of addiction and alcoholism has gained
considerable popular acceptance. See Sheila B. Blume, The Disease Concept of
Alcoholism, 1983, 5 J. PSYCH. TREATMENT & EVALUATION 471, 472 (1983); see also
Edward W. Desmond, Out in the Open: ChangingAltitudes and New Research Give Fresh
Hope to Alcoholics, TIME, Nov. 30, 1987, at 80, 81 (reporting the results of a Gallup
poll which found that "a great majority of American adults are convinced that
alcoholism is indeed an illness").
91 Moore, supra note 4, at 1127.
' See id. at 1126-27. On "ordinary language" theory, see RICHARDJ. BERNSTEIN,
PRAXIS AND ACTION: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY 230-304

(1971).

93 See id. at 1127.
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Suppose we place ourselves in ancient Babylon atjust the time the
Babylonian astronomers were discovering that the star that
appears in the morning ("The Morning Star") and the star that
appears in the evening ("The Evening Star") are one and the same
thing, namely, the planet Venus. One can imagine a Babylonian
ordinary-language philosopher "disproving" the astronomers' claim
in the following way: The philosopher has not been looking at
stars, but at language use. He has observed the phrases "Evening
Star" and "Morning Star" in all their ordinary uses, and has
learned from such observation that the phrases appear in different
categories of discourse, evening talk and morning talk. Accordingly, the phrases cannot refer to the same thing. If they did, a wellknown law of the logic of identity would require that the expressions be equivalent. Their differing uses, however, show that they
manifestly are not equivalent; indeed, it is absurd-a category
mistake-to even speak of the evening star and morning star as
existing in the same sense of "exist."
This example illustrates the problem of the ordinary-language
view of meaning and its accompanying doctrine of categorical
differences. Inferences from patterns of ordinary usage cannot
replace scientific insight about the true nature of the things to
which words refer. Science cannot be barred from making
discoveries, whether about planets or about minds, in the way the
doctrine of category differences claims it can. A more contemporary view of meaning holds that the meaning of words like
"intention" is given by the best scientific theory that one can
muster about the true nature of intentions, even though that
theory may involve knowledge that most ordinary speakers do not
have and that, accordingly, is not reflected in their ordinary usage
94

Initially, Moore's dismissal of the Babylonian philosopher makes
sense, given that ordinary-language theory based solely upon
linguistic analysis cannot, as a matter of logic, support the morning
star/evening star distinction in the face of conflicting scientific
insight. On the other hand, once the question is placed within a
larger social context, the nature of the scientific counterargument
is changed. Moore's preference for the Babylonian astronomers'
interpretation of the planet Venus is based upon his observation
that the philosopher is studying "language use" instead of stars.

94 Id. at 1126.
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Suppose, however, that we introduce a third category of
scholars, anthropologists, who are able to describe a series of social
practices, fundamental to the daily structuring of Babylonian
society, that stem from their longstanding belief in the coexistence
of the morning and evening stars. Perhaps there are important
religious practices that derive from the dualist cosmology, or a
unique system of timekeeping that depends upon a common belief
in the separability of the two stars.9 5 Now the debate about the
"true nature of things to which words refer" has been fundamentally
altered.
The dualist's claim no longer depends upon sterile
linguistic rules governing "category mistakes." 96
Rather, the
signifiers within this linguistic system-words such as "evening star"
and "morning star"-have been paired with signified objects or
linguistic referents-the fully-contextualized daily practice of the
Babylonians-so that the words now have a meaning which is as real
to the speakers of this language as the scientific meaning provided
97
by the astronomers' discovery.
Like the work of the Babylonian astronomers, Moore's work on
causation and the excuses is animated by realist theory rather than
a conventionalist understanding of what it means to describe an
agent as autonomous. 98 Moore provides an accurate account of
95 On the nexus between language and culture, seeJohn 0. Cole, Thoughtsfrom
the Land of And, 39 MERCER L. REV. 907, 922-23 (1988) (arguing that the "constructedness" of language plays a central role in constructing our world). Cf. Arthur A.
Leff, Law and, 87 YALE LJ. 989 (1978) (providing a hypothetical anthropology in
support of his argument that legal institutions must be understood within the systems
of social meanings in which they occur).
96 Moore, supra note 4, at 1125.
97 On the relationship between linguistic signifiers and signified objects, see
BELSEY, supra note 11, at 38-39; COLIN SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES:
AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARXIsT THEORY OF IDEOLOGYAND LAW 20-21(1979); Cole,
supra note 95, at 921.
98 Moore's clearest statement of the realist philosophy on which his work is
predicated may be found in Michael S. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theoty of Interpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985). See Brian Bix, MichaelMoore's Realist Approach to Law,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (1992) (criticizing Moore's metaphysically realist
theory of meaning from the perspective of ordinary language philosophy).
John Cole suggests that there are two ways of understanding our world. In the
"Land ofOr," we assume that "'every genuine question has one true answer,' that 'the
method which leads to correct solutions to all genuine problems is rational in
character,' and that '[t]hese solutions ... are true universally, eternally and
immutably.'" Cole, supra note 95, at 911 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, AGAINST THE
CURRENT 80, 81 (1979)). By contrast, in the "Land of And," we recognize that
"everything potentially exists in a state of contradiction," id. at 914, that this
contradiction "can only be removed by choosing a frame of reference," id., and that
the choice of frames is profoundly governed by social context. See id. at 918.
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excuse doctrine within the criminal law in much the same way that
the Babylonian astronomers provided an accurate account of Venus.
His analysis brings into full view the role of character-carried in his
account through the vehicle of practical reasoning-as that attribute
which renders an agent responsible. Moreover, the common law
requirements of voluntariness and (especially) mens rea are made
comprehensible by his theory, in that they are described as doctrinal
instruments designed to test the capacity and opportunity of the
defendant to engage in practical reasoning.
Moore's further claim, however, that practical reasoning is really
what matters cannot be sustained any more than the astronomers'
assertion with respect to the unity of the morning and evening stars,
if by "really" one means that practical reasoning has some sort of
independent epistemological significance. 9 Statements, propositions or systems of ideas do not become invested with meaning until
they are placed within a social context. 1° ° In order for Moore's
theory of responsibility to have the status he claims for it, it must be
grounded in some understanding of what people actually think, feel,
and believe. Thus, while Moore provides us with a good theory in the
sense that his work has the capacity to predict accurately which
actors will be held responsible for their conduct, he does not
provide much of an account of how people actually experience the
practice of assigning or withholding responsibility. 10 1
The failure of advocates to gain judicial sanction for a loss-ofcontrol defense in cases involving alcoholism or addiction is
illustrative of this gap between Moore's theory of responsibility and
our actual experience in assigning blame within the criminal law.
According to Moore, the fact that an addict's decision to use

o Cf. Alexander, supra note 63, at 3 (describing a false epistemology in which
"[t]he individualism and rationalism embraced in contemporaryjurisprudence" are
criticized as being "inherently limited, and limiting, perspectives").
100 "At the branching point, social scientists question natural science models as
representations of human experience, and, in different ways, embrace the premise
that the meanings of cultural and social forms are constituted in their use."
Greenhouse, supra note 11, at 687. See also MANNHEIM, supra note 11, at 93 (arguing

that all knowledge is mediated by "the total conception of ideology" since "[o]nly
when we are thoroughly aware of the limited scope of every point of view are we on

the road to the sought-for comprehension of the whole.").
101 For Moore's view as to what constitutes a good theory of excuse, see Moore,
supra note 4, at 1099-1100. Moore's claim is that his theory goes beyond mere
description or explanation to provide a normative basis for understanding and
applying excuse doctrine. But see, Fish, supra note 89, for a different view of the
relationship between theory and practice.
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narcotics was caused by factors such as genetics or early childhood
experience is not determinative in figuring his or her responsibility;
instead, the theory focuses upon the actor's capacity for practical
reasoning.10 2 Framed as a question about cognitive capacity, it is
relatively easy to see that addictive disorders short of insanity
generally will not yield an excuse, given that most users are able to
form an intention with respect to their addictive behavior. In this
respect, Moore's theory is highly predictive of actual outcomes. His
claims do not, however, comport with a more common view of
chemical dependency, which holds that the conduct of addicts and
alcoholics is the product of a struggle between nonautonomous
factors inclining them toward abuse and an autonomous free will
1 03
that could, and should, resist such a craving.
Moore's theoretical notion of responsibility relies upon a
technical distinction between the conditional and absolute forms of
the construction "could have done otherwise." 104 Essentially, the

unconditional form requires that the actor be possessed of a
decision-making capacity undetermined by extraneous factors. By
contrast, the conditional sense of "could," which Moore endorses,
requires only that the agent have the opportunity and capability to
do otherwise. 10 5 This distinction helps to carry Moore's revised
102 Moore, supra note 4, at 1131.
10

3 See e.g., Rosemary L. McGinn, ForMe Alcohol Is A Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,

1987, at 35 ("My alcoholism is a disease, medically treatable. But my ongoing
recovery depends on making healthy responsible choices every day."). Also typical
of this point of view are comments made by the victim of a noted compulsive obscene
telephone caller, reported in a recent news account:
Appearing on ABC's "Nightline," [the victim] listened stonily as the [caller
and his psychiatrist] told how he recalled being sexually abused as a child-a
memory "triggered" at the funeral of his father, who died in the very room
where the abuse occurred. That, [the victim] snorted, was no excuse. [The
caller] may well have been sick, but he should have controlled himself.
"Each time they [obscene callers] make that choice, they know that what
they're doing is wrong. They can choose to continue their illness, or they
can choose to say, 'That's it, I stop and I'm going to get help.'"
David Gelman, Was It Illness Or Immorality? Debate Over An Obscene CallerRufes
Washington, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 1990, at 55.
Of the various opinions in the Moore case,Judge Wilkey's discussion of addiction

as a struggle between the actor's "craving" and "strength of character" comes closest
to mirroring this point of view. See infra text accompanying notes 164-64.
104 Moore, supra note 4, at 1142.
105 This distinction between the absolute and conditional forms of the construction "could have done otherwise" was first developed in the work of G.E. Moore. See
G.E. MOoRE, ETHics 84-95 (1912); see also Moore, supra note 4, at 1142-43 (discussing
G.E. Moore's interpretation of the principle of responsibility).
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theory of responsibility because it makes it possible for him to
6
dodge the principle of transfer of powerlessness.10
Framed in terms of desert, it would be fair to say that Moore's
10 7
theory does not require that desert go "all the way down,"
since the basis of responsibility he adopts depends upon a practical
reasoning process which itself may be unfree.10 8 However, in
order to reject the principle of transfer of powerlessness as Moore's
theory invites us to do, we must be willing to agree that human
1 9
actors deserve the conditions which determine their choices. 0
106 Presumably, Moore would not deny that the conduct of someone who is
chemically dependent might be the product of nonautonomous factors as well as
choice. If we were interested in bringing forward all the factors that contributed to
the conduct, in an effort to describe as precisely as possible how that behavior came
about, Moore would no doubt agree that the causal account would be relevant. What
he would deny is that any such broad causal explanation is relevant to assigning
blame within the criminal law; we simply should not be interested in constructing
such explanations, because we should not regard the reasons why someone "did it"
as relevant to whether or not he or she is responsible. At bottom, Moore seems to be
making a substantive claim about the content of morality, to be accepted or rejected
by reference to what he takes to be shared moral intuitions.
In this respect, the quotes adduced in footnote 102 seem to display exactly the
sort of intuition Moore has in mind: the victim of the obscene caller seems to feel
that it is irrelevant why the caller harassed her-what matters is that he chose to call
and that he could have chosen to say "that's it, I stop." That she is willing to accept
that the desire to make such calls proceeds from an "illness" only strengthens the
point: her moral intuition is that the cause of his behavior does not matter, capacity
is what counts, and the caller's capacity to do otherwise leads the victim to hold him
responsible for failing to choose correctly. When Moore turns to the conditional
versus the absolute forms of the phrase "could have done otherwise," he is engaging
in unpacking this moral intuition. No one, Moore seems to be saying, really believes
that one is responsible only for those acts that are wholly undetermined by
extraneous factors.
The difficulty with this form of analysis, however, is that it fails to consider the
general question of where these moral intuitions come from. In addition, it fails to
take account fully of the gap between a theoretical treatment of an actor's cognitive
process-under which it does not matter that the rules of determinism regard all
rational thought as caused-and our common practice of viewing most cognitive work
as autonomous. Thus, the victim of the obscene caller might agree that the caller's
desire to act was an "illness," but she surely would not agree that his decision-making
process was itself wholly determined. It is with respect to this assumption of free will
that an analysis based upon theories of social construction must be employed.
107 This phrase is taken from RoBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 225

(1974). See also Weinreb, supra note 4, at 74-75 (discussing whether desert actually
does go "all the way down").
108See e.g., KELMAN, GUIDE TO CLS, supra note 1, at 88-90 (describing the
reasoning process as unfree in the sense that it may be determined by factors beyond
the control of the agent).
109 If people are to be held responsible for the consequences of choices over
which they have less than fully autonomous control, they are, in some sense, being
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Stated in this explicit fashion, it seems unlikely that most people
would agree to make freedom independent of desert, even though
such a decoupling in fact characterizes the outcomes of our blaming
practices.
Most members of the community are not philosophers capable
of an expansive detachment from deeply inscribed social convention. For most of us, it would be difficult to assign blame in an
individual case of wrongdoing if we understood clearly that the
offender's cognitive or evaluative process was as fully determined as
was his or her craving. 110 Our experience of blaming requires
that we understand human choices to be truly autonomous, in the
sense that they are free from the determining force of factors
beyond the control of the agent.
That we accept outcomes
inconsistent with such a normative posture means that both truths
contained within the intentionalist/determinist dualism must obtain
11 1
and both must be managed within the context of daily practice.

The second ground of Moore's attack upon the dualist
conception of freedom and responsibility revolves around this need
to manage its two inconsistent truths. He argues that the boundaries between the determinist and intentionalist notions of human

conduct must be clearly defined and permeable if there is to be any
held responsible for the conditions which go to determine their decision making. See
Weinreb, supra note 4, at 75.
110 This point was made by C.A. Campbell in criticizing G.E. Moore's conditional/
unconditional distinction:
For how can a man be morally responsible... if his choices, like all other
events in the universe, could not have been otherwise than they in fact
were? It is precisely against the background of world-views such as these
that for reflective people the problem of moral responsibility normally

arises.
Campbell, supra note 27, at 124.
1 1 See Percy W. Bridgman, Determinism and Punishment, in DETERMINISM AND
FREEDOM 143 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958). Bridgman notes that:
[W]e have to recognize clearly that there are two levels of operation. There
is the level of daily life and social interaction, i.e., the level of "free will,"
and there is the deterministic level ....
There is, and can be, no sharp dividing line between the vocabulary of
determinism and that of daily life ....
... At present the only technique we have for dealing with our fellows is to
act as if they were the same sort of creatures as we ourselves. We disregard
determinism when dealing with ourselves-we have to disregard it, within
reason, in our everyday contact with others.
Id. at 143-45.
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coherence within the dualist normative universe. They must be
clearly defined because otherwise the causal roots of behavior would
intrude upon the intentionalist story which is the basis for assigning
blame, making it impossible for individuals to be held accountable
according to traditional principles of responsibility. In addition,
they must be permeable because otherwise the causal roots of
behavior could not be identified, making it impossible for individuals to be excused according to the causal theory. In addition, says
Moore, the causal theory must be able to indicate when these
boundaries should be crossed, so that excuses can be granted and
112
withheld in a principled fashion.
Here again, at the level of theoretical criticism, Moore makes a
good point. If human conduct is simultaneously caused and the
product of an autonomous free will, our occasional shift from the
participant to the objective viewpoint ought to be predictable
according to some factor or factors which we can identify in
advance. In fact, Moore's theory provides the means for making
just this sort of prediction. The key element of his theory, a
judgment with respect to the offender's opportunity and capacity to
engage in practical reasoning, is the very factor that determines on
which side of the dualist divide a given case will reside. In a
manner of speaking, choices about whether to allow an excuse in a
specific case or class of cases do get made. It is a mistake, however,
to believe that those choices are experienced as (rather than
predicted by) the application of Moore's theory of responsibility, the
causal theory, or any other concatenation of abstract principles.
People "see" or "understand" or simply "live" through one or the
other of Strawson's perspectives as a consequence of deep social
convention. As Lloyd Weinreb has put it, "we ordinarily know
unhesitatingly which of the alternative points of view to adopt.
112

See Moore, supra note 4, at 1128. Weinreb puts the point as follows:
When an attribution of desert is challenged on the kind of grounds that, if

accepted, constitute an excuse, the abstract issue is made concrete by
evidence that supports the "objective" standpoint. Not every such
explanation will be accepted; the very core of Strawson's argument about
dual stand-points is that not every such explanation can be accepted,
although in principle one might be offered in every case. If we insist on the
attribution, despite the actual or theoretical availability of an explanation
from the other standpoint, we have to provide an answer to the protest, "I
don't deserve this."
Weinreb, supra note 4, at 60.
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rather, we
Even to say that we 'adopt' a point of view is too much;
113
simply perceive from one point of view or the other."
C. The IdeologicalFunction Of CriminalLaw Blaming Practice
Dualism, then, allows the causal theorist to avoid Moore's
reductio argument by describing human conduct as simultaneously
free and determined. These seemingly inconsistent truths persist
because the divide between actions and causes is ideological; it is114
a
social construction which derives from collective activity.
Contrary to Moore's claim, this dualism does not depend upon the
metaphysical or linguistic manipulations
of theorists. 115 It is a
116
necessary creature of social life.

Indeed, a permanent adoption of one perspective and a
corresponding categorical rejection of the other would be impossible. As Frankfurt makes clear, the near universal practice of
blaming or praising the conduct of individual human actors is
fundamental in distinguishing people from objects and the other
animals. 1 17 Human society depends upon the existence of autonomous actors who are capable of considering alternatives and
making free choices that direct their behavior.1"' This notion of
individual autonomy is significant, because, apart from God, the
only autonomous agents within our universe are ourselves and other
1 19
human actors.
113 Id. Cole provides a similar description when he says that:

[w]e decide allatonce through what frame we should assess or define "guilt"
.... [W]e restructure the world all at once by making a simultaneous
decision about how we will classify this defendant and what classification
system we will use to define the concept of "guilt," or "criminal responsibility," in general.
Cole, supra note 95, at 918 (emphasis added).
114 Cf. Richard Delgado, Storytelling For Oppositionists And Others: A Plea For
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 n.14 (1989) (citing LEvi-Strauss for the
proposition that "myths are used by social groups to overcome contradiction").
15o See Moore, supra note 4, at 1127.

See Bridgman, supra note 111, at 143-45.
117 See Frankfurt, supra note 37, at 66-67; see also Sidney Hook, Necessity,
Indeterminism, andSentimentalism, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM, supranote 9, at 45,
48 ("Sickness, accident, or incapacity aside, one feels lessened as a human being if
one's actions are always excused or explained away on the ground that despite
appearances one is really not responsible for them. It means being treated like an
object, an infant, or someone out of his mind.").
11' See id.; Boldt, supra note 61, at 996-1003.
119 Indeed, this capacity for self-actualization means that each of us has a bit of
the divine within us. See EMILE DURKHEIM, SELECTED WRITINGS 145-46 (Anthony
116
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At the same time, we all share an instinct to search for causal
explanations for occurrences in our environment. The real bite of
the determinists' theory is that its characterization of human
conduct is consistent with this instinct. 120 The proposition that
human conduct is determined by factors extraneous to the individual agent is true because it must be so by definition, but the
proposition that human conduct is ordinarily the result of autonomous decision-making on the part of the individual actor is also true
because without this belief human society might well become
dysfunctional.
It is, of course, a fair question to ask how these two opposed
realities are governed in everyday life. Strawson suggests that the
"appearance of contradiction" between the participant and objective
viewpoints arises only when the matter is considered from a
standpoint outside of culture. Standing inside society, he asserts,
the contradiction is "dispelled," because we are always already
12 1
looking through one or the other of the two lenses.
If we proceed from the liberal premise that individuals are presocial beings with definable characteristics independent of social
practice, Strawson's socially-contextualized resolution of the
problem will not work. Once we adopt a perspective that views the
characteristics of individualism as socially constructed,1 22 however, it becomes possible to search for examples of social practice that
instill in members of the community the ability unconsciously, yet
purposefully, to shift between the participant and objective viewpoints. 123

Giddens trans. & ed., 1972) (reproducing a translated excerpt from EMILE DURKHEIM,
THE DMisIoN OF LABOR IN SOCIETY); see also Steven Lukes, Durkheim's 'Individualism
And The Intellectuals'17POL. STUD. 16,25 (1969) (discussing a "religion of humanity
whose rational expression is the individualist morality").
120 See UNGER, supra note 63, at 199-202. Unger notes that:
Because man has no predetermined place in nature, he must make a place
for himself in it. In doing this, he is not satisfied with treating the natural
world as a source of means to the achievement of his ends. He wants to
recognize himself as one who belongs to the natural order from which he
has been thrown out by the gift of consciousness. The sentiment of being
part of the whole of nature is as deeply rooted in the self as the experience
of its separation from nature .... Thus, all human activities have a twofold
aspect. On the one hand, they acknowledge and perpetuate the barrier
between the conscious self and the natural world that is the condition of
subjectivity. On the other hand, they seek to bridge the gap.
Id. at 202.
121 STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURAuSM, supra note 2, at 38.
122
See Louis M. Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem
of Coerced Preferences,2 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 149, 173 (1990).
125 A central tenet of liberal individualism is the notion that every person is a
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The criminal law is the most visible and explicit institutional
setting for the working out of questions of individual responsibility.124

The legal doctrines of actus reus and mens rea, together

with the rules governing the excuses, constitute the institutional
mechanism by which individual cases are allocated to one side of
the dualist divide or the other. Taken on their own terms, these
doctrinal formulations are capable of sorting out a vast array of
human conduct, placing much of it on the participant side of the
125
moral ledger and some on the objective side.

morally significant agent as a consequence of his or her capacity to act freely and
autonomously. Moreover, this intellectual tradition holds that the characteristics that
render an individual free and autonomous-and therefore morally significant-do not
derive from social interaction, but exist prior to his or her entry into society. See
LACEY, supra note 60, at 144-46. A necessary conclusion drawn from these premises
by liberal theorists is that social groups are nothing more than collections of
individuals.
Roberto Unger has pointed out that this conclusion is important both methodologically and morally. Methodologically, it means that a social group can be fully
described by reference to the pre-social attributes of its constituent members and can
have no characteristics beyond those brought to it by participating individuals.
Morally, it means that the group must never be understood as a "source of values in
its own right." UNGER, supra note 63, at 81-82.
The point of view adopted by Unger and other critics of liberal individualism, by
contrast, is that a social group is an "entity with independent existence irreducible to
the lives of its members, with group values that stand apart from the individual and
subjective ends of its membership." Id. at 82. From this alternative point of view it
is methodologically possible to identify group attributes, in the form of social
practices and conventions, that derive not from the essence of its individual members
but from a process of interaction among them. Additionally, from a normative
standpoint, it becomes possible to assign moral significance to attributes of the
group-or what we might term the ideological content of the group-in recognition
of the fact that values held by the group taken as a whole may not be identifiable at
the level of the individual, who may hold such values "only partially and insofar as
they are absorbed into the group." Id.
124 With respect to the general claim implicated above, that the legal system
operates to construct consciousness, see Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories,
36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984) (noting that "lawmaking and law-interpreting
institutions have been among the primary sources of the pictures of... some of the
most commonplace aspects of social reality that ordinary people carry around with
them and use in ordering their lives"). As to the more particular claim, that the
criminal law operates to construct notions of autonomous individual responsibility,
see Cole, supra note 95, at 911, 925 ("In the framework of our law, the defendant is
seen through a prism of individual responsibility and free choice."). For a more
utilitarian view of the expressive function of the criminal law, see FRANK TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 18-19 (1938) (discussing the role of the criminal
law in motivating and guiding conduct); Gordon Hawkins, Punishmentand Deterrence:
The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 550, 557-58
(surveying the societal benefits of criminal punishment).
125 "[T]he defendant exists in the space of being guilty and not guilty and awaits
creation as one or the other. This 'all at once' decision is what a criminal trial is all
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Moreover, as Mark Kelman has made clear, the substantive
criminal law is pervaded by "interpretive constructs," "arational"
practices by which the universes of available facts and legal rules are
winnowed so that only "relevant" facts and "applicable" rules remain
to shape the outcome of a particular adjudication. 126 Kelman
identifies a number of these interpretive constructs, among which
he includes broad and narrow time frames, disjoined and unified
events, and broad and narrow views of intent. 127 All of these
practices operate selectively to obscure or to reveal the determinist
1 28
account lurking behind every instance of human conduct.
For example, the interpretive construct involving time framing
regulates the extent to which facts about a defendant's personal
history and facts about events before and after the precise moment
of a criminal incident will be made a part of the formal proceedings.
Resolution of this question goes a long way toward defining the
defendant's conduct in intentionalist or determinist terms, because
inclusion of such information through broad time framing (the
designation of it as relevant to the legal question) frequently
provides evidence of causal factors beyond the control of the agent,
while exclusion through narrow time framing creates the illusion of
129
autonomy.
Similarly, with respect to the interpretive construct governing
disjointed and unified accounts, criminal law doctrine can shape the
legal story so that facts occurring over time are characterized as a
single event or as a series of discrete events. Disjoining sequential
facts frequently has the effect of rendering irrelevant information
which otherwise may prompt the causal account. Alternatively, a
about...." Cole, supra note 95, at 919. See also Louis ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX 23234 (1969) (claiming that the law "transforms" the "human subject" into a "legal

subject" and thereby influences perceptions of social relationships).
126 See Kelman, Interpretive Construction, supra note 1, at 592; see alsoJ.M. Balkin,
The Rhetoric Of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197 (1990) (discussing the recurring
rhetorical devices employed throughout diverse areas of law to characterize
competing
notions of responsibility).
1
I See Kelman, InterpretiveConstruction,supra note 1, at 593-96. Cole's discussion
of shifting "frames" is somewhat similar. See Cole, supra note 95, at 914-16 (arguing
that it is by choosing a frame of reference that we "create" the defendant as guilty or
innocent).
128 See Cole, supra note 95, at 915 (arguing that when the defendant is "created"
as guilty or not guilty at trial, "the other account... is suppressed"); cf. Greenhouse,
supra note 68, at 1637 (observing that contesting notions of time are mediated
through the legal system in such a way that crucial differences are "suppressed" or
"blurred").
12 See Kelman, Interpretive Construction,supra note 1, at 594, 600-05, 642-45.
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decision to view such a sequence together can have the effect of
exculpating the defendant by bringing his or her "conduct" within
13 0
one of the categories of excuse.
Kelman concludes his work on interpretive construction by
suggesting three possible characterizations of his own analysis.
First, he suggests that the reader might interpret his article as
garden variety legal realism. 131 Alternatively, he acknowledges
that his work may be understood as an attempt to account for and
describe the operation of interpretive construction at a level of
abstraction higher than that afforded by traditional doctrinal
analysis. 132 Finally, he offers the possibility that his enterprise is
merely aesthetic because interpretive constructs "are not politically
meaningful at all, but simply inexplicably unpatterned mediators of
experience, the inevitably nonrational filters we need to be able to
perceive or talk at all."1 33
All three of Kelman's characterizations of the operation of
interpretive construction within the criminal law are plausible. His
designation of the third option as merely "aesthetic," however, may
have prevented him from identifying a fourth, related possibility:
that inconsistent time framing and the other interpretive constructs
function as mechanisms by which a determinist/intentionalist
dualism is managed within the criminal law, and by extension,
within society generally.
If we accept the premise that the criminal law performs an
ideological function on behalf of the group, 134 then it may be
possible that Kelman's interpretive constructs are not "inexplicably
unpatterned mediators of experience,"1 3 5 but quite highly patterned structures which shape experience. Complex human stories
frequently contain an amalgam of information, some of which fits
'30 See id. at 594-95, 642-45.
131 See id. at 669.
132 In this respect, Kelman suggests that the selective obscuration of the
deterministic roots of human conduct may serve to maintain a hierarchical class
structure. See id. at 670.
155 Id. at 671.
134 The suggestion here is that criminal law blaming practice is an institutional
process by which a socially constructed reality, an ideology of individual autonomy,
is created. See Boldt, supra note 61, at 974-76; see also, Richard A. Ball, A Theory of
Punishment: Restricted Reprobationand the Reparationof Social Reality, in STRUCTURE,
LAW, AND POWER. EsSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 135, 141-42 (Paul J.
Brantingham &Jack M. Kress eds., 1979) (discussing the construction of a "symbolic
universe"); Trubek, supra note 7, at 604 (explaining that "interpretivists" understand
the legal system as constructing notions of individual volition).
153 Kelman, Interpretive Construction,supra note 1, at 671.
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more readily with the participant viewpoint and some of which is
easily cognizable within the objective perspective. As those stories
are translated into legal narratives molded by the criminal law
doctrines that define offenses and the excuses, they become
rationalized, unified, and suitable for a focused viewing through one
of our two available lenses."3 6 In the process, we acquire a generalized ability to attend to some information we encounter in daily
life and to filter out other data we confront, so that we are able to
13 7
maintain a line of separation between the two perspectives.
This relationship between the work of formal blaming within the
criminal law and the informal and unconscious attributions (and
nonattributions) of responsibility we make all the time in daily life
is difficult to characterize. Roberto Unger makes the point that
within every social situation there is a "dominant social consciousness."138 He suggests that a mentality achieves dominance not
StE
4

beas

iS

Su~t.SL

10y duWt

SS..Jst

portIfn

w.Yrih~fint.

--

ISru ttj

Le
h

most numerous but rather because it is actualized-played out-in
the practices of the social order. Thus, a particular way of comprehending reality becomes dominant within the group when individual
interactions within society are "arrange[d]... similarly to the ways
13 9
in which the type of consciousness pictures their relations."
It may well be that Moore's theory provides an abstract template
for mapping the rhetorical patterns of interpretive construction
within the criminal law. Perhaps time frames are doctrinally
elongated or constricted, events doctrinally conjoined or segmented,
and intention defined broadly or narrowly, according to a pattern
that correlates with the actor's capacity and opportunity to engage

"6

On the capacity of litigation to reformulate reality, see Shelley Bannister &

Dragan Milovanovic, TheNecessity Defense, SubstantiveJusticeandOppositionalLinguistic
Praxis, 18 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 179, 198 (discussing litigation as a "translation process").
On the function of legal narratives generally, see Robin West, Narrative Responsibility
and Death: A Comment On The Death Penalty Cases From the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 162 (1990) (arguing that when lawyers tell stories they

"contribute to the creation of a community"). See alsoAllison G. Anderson, Lawyering
in the Classroom: An Address to First Year Students, 10 NOVA LJ. 271 (1986); Robert M.
Cover, Foreword:The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARY. L. REV.
4, 4-5; Delgado, supra note 114, at 2439.
137 Cf. Cole, supra note 95, at 931-32 (arguing that the trial process "composes our

world for us").
138 UNGER, supra note 63, at 149.
...Id. Of course, the reverse-that a dominant reality shapes social interactionsmay be true as well. See Hunt, supra note 7, at 18.
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in practical reasoning. The ability of Moore's theory to predict
outcomes suggests that such a correlation exists.
The predictive power of the theory, however, must be consid-

ered together with the gap between Moore's abstract description of
responsibility and our everyday moral experience in assigning
responsibility. As legal theorists considering the structure of
doctrinal categories like insanity or duress, we can apply Moore's
theory to determine whether a particular class of actors ought
properly to be regarded as responsible; however, as a community
generally employing fixed rules corresponding to a dominant social
consciousness, we are merely likely to conclude that an individual
140
is or is not responsible.
Weinreb makes a different but related claim regarding the role
of legal doctrine in constructing social reality. In the course of
considering the problematic doctrinal area of felony murder, in
which criminal responsibility attaches even though the defendant's
conduct may only be a "but-for" cause of resulting harm, Weinreb
suggests that the law operates to reinforce "the deep ontological
assumption that human experience is contained within, or composes, a normative order." 141 The hard cases are those in which a
normative natural order is called into question because harm
occasioned indirectly by the defendant's conduct seems more
readily to have been caused by the nonhuman agency of fate-for
example, where a shot fired by the police while responding to a
defendant's felonious conduct is the proximate cause of the death
on which the felony-murder conviction is predicated. 14 2 In such
cases, criminal law doctrine works to attribute responsibility to the
human actor, even though such an attribution does not comport
with our ordinary understanding of desert, because to do otherwise
14 3
would require us to blame nature itself.
140 See KELMAN, GUIDE TO CLS, supra note 1, at 90-91; cf Weinreb, supra note 4,
at 61.
141 Weinreb, supra note 4, at 73.
142 Such a scenario is possible under the laws of at least somejurisdictions. See,
e.g., People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582 (Ill. App. 1973), af'd, 319 N.E.2d 511 (Ill.
1974) (upholding felony-murder conviction where shot that killed police officer was
fired by other officers in pursuit of defendant); see also Hickman v. Commonwealth,
398 S.E.2d 698 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding conviction of accomplice in the
felonious possession of a lethal drug dose, if the defendant helped to prepare the
drug injection). But see King v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 704 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding second degree felony murder rule not applicable to death of a co-felon in
plane crash if plane was feloniously transporting drugs but the crash was not directly
caused by the felonious purpose of the flight).
14s See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 76:
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At one level of abstraction, the practice of attributing responsibility to human actors in felony-murder cases worries us because
desert attaches even though the felon may not have been free to
control circumstances that fundamentally determined the consequences of his or her conduct. At a higher level of abstraction,
however, the incapacity of the felon to control the circumstances
leading to the victim's death should be no more troubling than the
felon's incapacity to control his or her own decision-making
processes. Desert and freedom may not coincide for the defendant
in a felony-murder case, but then neither do they coincide for any
human actor in any case, once the truth of determinism is granted.
In the final analysis, Weinreb suggests, the criminal law holds the
defendant responsible in a felony-murder case "in order not to
undermine the conventional basis of desert altogether, by calling
into question whether a person can ever truly be said to have acted
with freedom and responsibility despite the determinate conditions
1
of his existence." 4

II. THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICALLY-DEPENDENT OFFENDERS
Returning to the question posed by the Moore case, we can begin
to lay the foundation for a similar claim regarding the criminal law's
treatment of chemically-dependent offenders. OnJanuary 29, 1970,
Raymond Moore was arrested by members of the Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police Force and charged with possession of heroin.
At trial, Moore's counsel offered the testimony of a psychiatric
expert that Moore was an addict who was "compelled" to obtain and
use heroin.14 5 The expert testimony had been offered to further

Although we are acquainted with natural fortune and misfortune of all
kinds, [in a case like Hickman] the intervention of what we think of as a
humanly (that is, self-determined) wrongful act strains the assumption that
the death is within a normative order at all; the explicit evidence of
normative disorder is too great. By identifying the commission of the felony
as the cause of the death and attributing the death to the felon, it is as if we
exculpate nature (which is not without some responsibility).
144 Id. at 77.
145 Moore's testimony before the trial court was that he had used heroin on a
regular basis since 1946 and that at the time of his arrest he was addicted to heroin.
He further testified that in the weeks immediately preceding his arrest, his addiction
ranged from 50 to 70 capsules a day. Moore did not live at the hotel in which he was
arrested but had come to the hotel in order to purchase the 50 capsules of heroin
which were in his possession at the time of arrest. His testimony was that he had
come to the hotel room 10 or 15 minutes before the police arrived and that he
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Moore's contention that basic common law principles of criminal
responsibility exculpate a defendant when he or she "is so far
addicted to [the] use of habit-forming narcotic drugs as to have lost
the power of self-control." 146

The trial court refused to allow the jury to hear the expert's
testimony, presumably because it disagreed with Moore's assertion
that a loss of control caused by addiction could form the basis for
an excuse. As the issue was framed on appeal, the question became
whether "possession of heroin by an addict, though conscious and
intentional, lacks elements indispensable to criminality under
fundamentals of our system of justice." 147 More broadly, the
question in the case was whether an impaired ability to exercise
choice occasioned by a defendant's dependence upon an addictive
substance should relieve that defendant of criminal responsibility
for conduct closely associated with that addiction.
Moore's argument was nonconstitutional in nature, and turned
upon an interpretation of the common law and statutory rules
governing criminal responsibility and the granting of excuses. In
this respect, the case can be distinguished from Powell v. Texas,1 4 s
an earlier United States Supreme Court case in which a similar
argument framed in constitutional terms had been raised by an
149
alcoholic defendant charged with public intoxication.

intended to use the purchased heroin that night and the next morning before going
to work. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
1
4 Id. at 1164 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 1178.
148 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
149 Powell,in turn, can be distinguished from Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), an even earlier Supreme Court case in which a California law making it a
criminal offense to be "under the influence of" or "addicted to" the use of narcotics
was found to violate the Eight Amendment's prohibition against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment. The various opinions in Robinson suggested at least two bases for this
holding- first, that it is unconstitutional to attach criminal liability to a mere status
in the absence of some positive conduct; and, second, that it is unconstitutional to
punish as criminal a status that may have been involuntarily acquired. The defendant
in the Powell case sought to build upon the second of these two rationales by
suggesting that his conviction for public intoxication was unconstitutional in light of
the involuntary nature of his conduct. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 531-35. In rejecting this
argument,Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality of the Court, made clear that it was
not the lack of volition, but the lack of any conduct whatsoever, which had created
the constitutional infirmity in Robinson. Since Powell had engaged in affirmative
conduct by appearing in public, the plurality held that he could constitutionally be
subjected to criminal punishment. Id. at 535-37.
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In his opinion for a plurality of the Court in Powell, Justice
Marshall declined to recognize a constitutional rule that a defendant's conduct must be the product of his or her volition or free
will in order for criminal liability to attach. Although he pointed
out significant weaknesses in the trial record and took issue with
Powell's characterization of alcoholism as a "disease," Justice
Marshall's holding proceeded principally from a clear reluctance to
begin the process of building a constitutional law of crimes, given
the Constitution's virtual silence as to matters of substantive
criminal law. 15° Nevertheless, the opinion did invite defendants
to press common law and statutory arguments of a similar nature in
state courts:
The doctrines of actus reus, mes rea, insanity, mistake,justification,
and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of
the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment
151
has always been thought to be the province of the States.
This invitation to seek an "adjustment" of the substantive
criminal law in nonconstitutional fora was duly taken up by the
defendant in the Moore case. Not surprisingly, many of the same
concerns which had given pause to the Powell plurality reemerged
in the Moore majority's treatment of parallel arguments, now
transposed to sound in nonconstitutional terms. Once again, the
effort to obtain judicial recognition of a new addiction/alcoholism
defense was turned back. 152

, Marshall seemed troubled by Powell's testimony that he had managed to limit

himself to one drink on the day of trial. Indeed, Marshall argued that the trial court's
findings regarding Powell's "chronic alcoholism" were not "'findings of fact' in any
recognizable, traditional sense." Powell, 392 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion). With
respect to the characterization of alcoholism as a disease, Marshall suggested that this
was merely the result of the medical profession's decision to "attempt to treat those
who have drinking problems," and did not represent any sort of scientific consensus
as to what alcoholism was or how it ought to be managed. Id. at 522-24. Most
important, though, were Marshall's doubts regarding the wisdom of constitutionalizing notions of criminal responsibility. In his words: "It is simply not yet the time
to write into the Constitution formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let alone
relevance, is not yet clear either to doctors or to lawyers." Id. at 537.
For a good discussion of the Constitution's silence as to matters of criminal
responsibility, see Kent Greenawalt, 'Uncontrollabie"Actionsand the Eighth AmendmenL"
Implicationsof Powell v. Texas, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 927 (1969) (pointing out that only
the Eighth Amendment and, perhaps, the prohibitions against ex postfacto laws speak
to substantive matters within the criminal law).
151 Powell, 392 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion).
1'2 Several years before Moore, the D.C. Circuit, in Watson v. United States, 439
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The JudicialDebate

Skelly Wright, who, along with three other members of the
Court dissented from the majority's holding,1 5 3 embraces the
exculpatory claims raised by the defendant. In his opinion, Judge
Wright sets out the contours of a new defense he would make
available to addicted defendants like Moore. In his view, the
relevant question is whether addicts should be blamed and punished
or treated as diseased persons in need of treatment.1 5 4 Wright
goes about answering this question by setting out a wealth of detail
regarding the "disease model" of addiction. 155
Perhaps most
significant for present purposes, he describes both the "initial
decision to experiment with addicting drugs" and the "effects of this
initial exposure" in classically deterministic terms, which "rang[e]
from the biochemical to the cultural." 156
By contrast, the opinion sets out the jurisprudential premises
upon which Anglo-American notions of criminal responsibility rest
in language which is cathected with notions of enlightenment
individualism.1 5 7 Wright explains that punishment is appropriate
only in those instances where blame for an untoward act fairly can
be attributed to the "free will" of the offender. "Morally legitimate"

F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane), had taken a tentative step in the direction of
recognizing a loss-of-control excuse of this sort. In that case, the court observed that
an addict's conduct in purchasing, possessing, and using narcotics is part of the
disease ofaddiction itself. Building upon Robinson, it suggested, without deciding on
the particular record before it, that either Congress did not intend to hold the
nontrafficking addict criminally responsible for mere possession or, if it did, that such
liability would be unconstitutional. See also United States v. Sutton, 346 F. Supp 464
(D.D.C. 1972) (indicating that defendant could challenge that part of his conviction
that held him liable for being a non-trafficking addict); United States v. Ashton, 317
F. Supp 860 (D.D.C. 1970) (dismissing portion of charge covering possession of
narcotics because no intent to traffic could be established). For a fuller discussion
of the various opinions in the Powell case, see Greenawalt, supra note 150, at 930-35;
Nemerson, supra note 6, at 421.
153 Judge Wright's dissent was joined by Judges Bazelon, Tamm, and Robinson.
See Moore, 486 F.2d at 1208 (Wright, J., dissenting).
154 The opinion contains a lengthy historical section which chronicles the shifting
lenses through which American society has viewed narcotic addiction since the turn
of the century. Apparently, for years both the medical community and the criminal
justice system have asserted expertise in and jurisdiction over the problem of
addiction, although the relative influence of each sphere has fluctuated considerably
over time. See Moore, 486 F.2d at 1215-29 (Wright, J., dissenting).
155
156

Id. at 1229-35.
Id. at 1230.

157 For a good discussion of liberal individualism, see LACEY, supra note 60, at
144-46.
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punishment requires culpability, and culpability is present only in
the acts of a responsible moral agent-one who is possessed of the
158
ability to choose between right and wrong.
Moreover, says Wright, a person's capacity to exercise choice,
and the concomitant ability to produce behavior voluntarily, is
essential to criminal guilt regardless of the penological goal
identified in any particular prosecution. Thus, if an offender's
liberty is to be infringed on retributive grounds, 159 it must be as
a consequence of his or her desert; because, a fortiori, desert
attaches only to wrongful conduct that is properly attributable to
the will of the actor and not to some "disease" that has overcome

his or her decision-making processes, punishment for conduct that
is symptomatic of an illness is precluded. 16° Similarly, says
Wright, where the goal is deterrence, even if punishment of an
offender for conduct beyond his or her control may inhibit others
who have not yet lost control, such a utilitarian exercise would
involve treating the addict as a "mere vehicle through which to
deter others," and would therefore be "inappropriate for soci16 1
ety."
Taken on its own terms, Wright's opinion presents a powerful
argument for recognition of an addiction defense. In his conception, conduct is either the product of free choice, and on that basis
subject to blame and punishment, or the result of a compulsion
beyond the decision-making capacity of the actor, in which case
treatment is indicated. Once the question is posed in this fashion,
the considerable data adduced by Wright regarding the loss of
158 See Moore, 486 F.2d at 1240-41 (WrightJ., dissenting). The central normative
element of the loss-of-control defense adopted by Wright was the notion that blame-

and, by extension, punishment-should only attach to conduct that is the product of
an actor's free will. Consistent with this principle of responsibility, Wright suggested

that the criminal law has long recognized a variety of excuses that exculpate
defendants whose otherwise criminal conduct is in some sense involuntary. Because
Wright was persuaded that possession and use of narcotics is involuntary conduct on
the part of chemically-dependent defendants, he concluded that recognition of a new

excuse was appropriate. See id. at 1241-42.
159 Wright, however, displays considerable skepticism regarding this particular
penological goal. See id.at 1243.
160 See id. at 1242-43.
161 Id. at 1245. H.L.A. Hart's view that utilitarian theories of punishment must
be bounded by normative principles of desert is directly relevant to judge Wright's
reasoning here. See HART,supra note 14, at 54-89. Wright goes on to make similar
arguments with respect to specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation. SeeMoore,
486 F.2d at 1245-47 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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control suffered by addicts seems dispositive, at least as to the issue
presented by the defendant Moore.
Two related conceptual difficulties lurk behind judge Wright's
formulation. On the one hand, because the logic of his approach
depends upon an essential absence of choice on the part of the
addicted offender with respect to conduct otherwise deemed
criminal, Wright is forced to deny the possibility that volition and
compulsion (or free will and determinism) can coexist, at least with
respect to the use of addictive substances by chemically-dependent
persons. On the other hand, given his reliance on a scientific
conception of alcoholism and addiction 162 that contains the
predicates for relieving chemically-dependent offenders of criminal
responsibility for much other conduct related to their disease in a
more attenuated fashion, Wright must either allow for a fairly
broad-sweeping new defense or arbitrarily limit the scope of his
proposal to conduct such as possession, which can be described as
163
"inherent in the disease itself."

Both of these difficulties received attention from Judge Wilkey

in his concurring opinion. Wilkey, in voting to turn back Moore's
effort to gain recognition for an addiction defense, constructs a
schematic theory of choice and compulsion in order to illustrate his
markedly different views regarding the way in which the behavior of

chemically-dependent offenders is produced. In Wilkey's view, an
addict's ability to control his or her activities is determined by two
factors: "physical craving" and "strength of character." 164 In a
rather mechanistic fashion, Wilkey explains that an addict with a
"craving" that is more powerful than his or her "strength of
character" will experience a loss of control, while another addict,
whose "craving" is less than his or her "strength of character," will
resist the temptations posed by the physical need to obtain or use
drugs. In each instance, says Wilkey, "the legally important factor
165
is the resulting loss [or maintenance] of self-control."
A likely premise of Wilkey's point of view is that an alcoholic or
addict should be convicted and punished for criminal behavior even
when it is the product of a drug-induced compulsion, not because
desert attaches as a consequence of behavior per se, but because the
actor's conduct has demonstrated his or her inadequate "strength
162 See infra text accompanying notes 224.
163 Moore, 486 F.2d at 1255 (Wright, J., dissenting).

164 Id. at 1145 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
165 Id.
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of character."
Unfortunately, Wilkey provides neither a clear
definition of the phrase "strength of character" nor an explanation
of how one derives his or her "character" and how its "strength" is
determined. 16 At most, Wilkey has simply split off the biochemical determinants of an addict's behavior from those which are
psychosocial in nature. 167 Without more, it is difficult to see why
the latter are any more deserving of blame and punishment than the
former if, as Judge Wright asserts, freedom of choice is always an
essential ingredient for assessing criminal responsibility.
In addition, Judge Wilkey fails to account for the probability
that two persons with identical "strength of character" but different
degrees of "physical craving" would be treated differently under his
scheme. Smith, confronting a more severe craving, can be expected
to engage in proscribed conduct (for example, narcotics possession),
while Jones, whose craving is less severe, will presumably be able to
resist it successfully. Even though the two would be indistinguishable in terms of blameworthiness (if, in fact, blameworthiness
derives from "strength [or weakness] of character"), Smith, but not
Jones, would be punished.
One solution to this difficulty, of course, is to say that it is
conduct that determines culpability or blameworthiness: 168 Smith
is to be punished because he has acted, and acted wrongfully; Jones
is blameless because he has not. The problem with this response is
that it fails to account for the criminal law excuses that are
uncontroversially 169 granted to actors who exhibit certain traits
"6 Judge Wilkey does explain that "craving" is meant to refer to the physiological
consequences of the interplay between a chemically-dependent person's biochemistry

and the properties of a given substance. See id.
167 For a fuller discussion of the elements comprising the "disease" of addiction,
see infra notes 184-202 and accompanying text.
1 All jurisdictions in the United States require an act or omission for criminal
liability. In addition, the Robinson case stands, at the least, for the proposition that
conduct, as opposed to status, is a constitutional requisite for criminal responsibility.
See supra note 149.
169 The recent trend toward creating a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" suggests
the presence of some measure of controversy in this area. In the early part of the
1980s a number ofjurisdictions adopted statutory provisions allowing for this verdict.
Beginningwith Michigan in 1975, twelve states have adopted this approach, prompted
in large part by the highly publicized case of John Hinckley. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.47.030 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 408 (Supp. 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-2(b) (SmithHurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-3 (Burns 1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 504.120 (Baldwin 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-7-2 (Supp. 1986);
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even though unrelated to conduct, such as infant offenders and
those with severe psychiatric disorders. 170 Unless one's view is
that culpability requires only some freedom of choice, in which case
the deterministic element is simply being pushed further below the
surface, a way out of the dilemma must be sought that introduces
171
considerations beyond those discussed thus far.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (Supp. 1986). What is significant about this "GBMI

Movement," is that it allows a defendant simultaneously to be adjudged criminally
liable and not responsible. See Bradley D. McGraw, et al., The 'Guilty But Mentally ll
Plea and Verdict: CurrentState of the Knowledge, 30 ViLL. L. REv. 117, 121 (1985). The
GBMI verdict has been strongly criticized by scholars as conceptually flawed and
procedurally problematic. Constitutional challenges have been numerous, although
GBMI statutes have withstood both state and federal constitutional attack on equal
protection and due process grounds. See McGraw, et al., supra, at 148-54.
Significantly, however, the movement seems to have stalled, and there has been little
new legislative or judicial initiative in those states that did not develop "GBMI"
verdicts by 1986. This suggests the continuing viability of the traditional principle of
responsibility, at least in some form.
Even so, it is fair to say that the sorts of excuses referred to here are firmly
established features of our criminal law, their continued validity not the focus of any
serious disagreement.
170 See supra note 71.
171 Faced, on the one hand, with Wright's principle of responsibility and, on the
other, with a causal theory of addiction, Wilkey saw clearly that efforts to cabin the
determinist force of the proposed loss-of-control defense were unlikely to succeed,
and that "the relentless advance of a method of inquiry ... that dismisses the
explanatory value of individual free will and responsibility" might well undermine the
very foundations of the criminal law. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 63. To avoid this
result, Wilkey undertook not a factual assault on the reliability of Moore's medical
evidence, but a questioning of the normative premise upon which his legal claim
rested, the causal theory of excuse. SeeMoore, 486 F.2d at 1147-48 (WilkeyJ., voting
to affirm all convictions and the sentences in the District Court).
In dismissing a causal theory of responsibility, however, Wilkey may have created
more problems than he solved. In the first place, it is elementary that retributive
notions of desert rest upon the principle that autonomous choice must accompany
blame, and Wilkey nowhere suggested that he was willing to rely upon purely
utilitarian theories of punishment to ground the criminal law's system of sanctioning
untoward conduct. For a good example of a purely utilitarian theory of punishment,
see Morris N. Eagle, Responsibility,UnconsciousMotivation, andSocial Order,6 INT'LJ.L.
& PSYCHIATRY 263 (1983). For a more general discussion of the role of utilitarianism
within the criminal law, see HART, supra note 14, at 158-85. In addition, the simple
removal of the free will requirement does not seem to comport with certain basic
doctrinal features of the criminal law, such as the voluntary act requirement, see, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962), or the fairly extensive range of excuses that are
present in the common law and most jurisdictions' penal codes; see, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962) (duress); id. § 4.01 (mental disease or defect excluding
responsibility).
Rather, it would seem that, in order to maintain both the structure of established
doctrine and the moral underpinnings of the system, resolution of the dilemma
requires either a redefinition of the responsibility principle itself or some alternative
conception of blame and desert. At this point in the analysis, of course, a theory of
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Writing for two members of the majority, Judge Leventhal
broadens the discussion to include factors beyond this tight nexus
of choice, compulsion, and blame. Leventhal's opinion examines
the long-recognized criminal law defenses of duress and insanity,

and concludes that both are distinguishable from the proposed
alcoholism/addiction defense in terms of evidentiary reliability. He
points out that the excuse of duress is "inapplicable to a purely
internal psychic incapacity," and requires proof that the defendant
was compelled to act by some other person.172 Because the source
of this sort of compulsion is external to the defendant, and
therefore observable, Leventhal implies that it is more obviously
suitable to proof by way of ordinary testimonial evidence.
With respect to the insanity defense, Judge Leventhal makes
much of the fact that all of the acknowledged doctrinal formulations
require proof of some mental disease or defect, as well as evidence
of a link between that psychiatric impairment and the defendant's
cognitive or volitional incapacity. In a matter of several pages,
Leventhal twice quotes a passage from the commentary to the
Model Penal Code to the effect that the criminal law "cannot vary
legal norms with the individual's capacity to meet the standards they
prescribe, absent a disability that is both gross and verifiable, such
as the mental disease or defect that may establish irresponsibility."17 3 Leventhal's analysis builds upon his earlier opinion in
United States v. Brawner,174 in which the D.C. Circuit declined to
accept "an all-embracing unified field theory" 175 which would
have exculpated "anyone whose capacity for control is insubstantial." 176 Leventhal explains that expert testimony as to "the
consequences generally attendant on the kind of mental illness
responsibility based upon practical reasoning comes into play.
172 Moore, 486 F.2d at 1180 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Of course, the actor's

ability to resist the compulsion (his or her "strength of character") is still legally
relevant, and measured in most jurisdictions by way of an objective standard of
reasonableness. See e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(providing that the defense of duress is available only if "a person of reasonable
firmness" in the defendant's situation would have been unable to resist the coercion).
173 Moore, 486 F.2d at 1180 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.09 commentary at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Judge Leventhal quotes a
portion of this passage again. See id. at 1184.
'74 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17 5 Id. at 995.
176 Moore, 486 F.2d at 1181.
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involved" 17 7 is necessary before a judge or jury can parse the
crucial legal distinction "between incapacity and indisposition,
between those who can't and those who won't, between the impulse
178
irresistible and the impulse not resisted."
In essence, Leventhal rejects the proposed addiction defense
because he believes an offender's loss of control or involition should
only become relevant in figuring his or her criminal responsibility
when it results from an external force or a psychiatric disease that
is both "gross and verifiable." 179 Leventhal carves out this seemingly manageable rule because he is sensitive to the difficulties
inherent in distinguishing "between those who can't and those who
won't," and because he is concerned about what he sees as the
circular nature of the diagnostic criteria commonly employed to
identify addictions.18s
This circularity, he suggests, stems from
the fact that a chemically-dependent person is defined simply as one
who has lost the ability to control his or her use of an addictive sub-

stance. Yet this formulation lacks "criteria external to the actions
which it is invoked to excuse." 18 1 Leventhal thus concludes that
there is no way for the adjudicative process to distinguish between
those substance abusers who have acted involuntarily and those who
182
have acted culpably.

'77
78 Id. at 1182 n.80.

1 Id. at 1182 (footnote omitted).
'

79

Id. at 1184 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 commentary at 6 (Tent. Draft

No. 10, 1960).

180 See id. at 1185.

181 Id. at 1184.
182 Unfortunately, this attempt by Judge Leventhal to resolve the antinomy

between determinism and intentionalism in cases of addiction or alcoholism is not
persuasive. It simply is not credible to assert that a chemically-dependent person's
behavior is the product solely of his or her free will. Although Leventhal seemed to
be troubled by the circularity of the diagnostic criteria employed in this area, it is
difficult not to credit the findings of clinicians that a chemically-dependent patient's
genetic, biochemical, and environmental background contribute significantly to his
or her illness. On the "medical model of addiction," see infra text accompanying
notes 184-202.
More importantly, Leventhal's efforts to draw a factually-derived line between
categories of conduct to which he would apply a causal account (for example, duress
and insanity) and those as to which he would refuse such a description (for example,
chemical dependency) cannot succeed because, at root, all human behavior is
determined by antecedent factors not properly subsumed within traditional notions
of free choice. This claim is axiomatic and definitional rather than empirical. See
supra note 1.
The problem, in short, is not factual but conceptual. Determinism, "the
doctrine that every event, including human actions and willings, has a cause," Moore,
supra note 4, at 1112, must be true as an objective account of our universe because

1992] CONSTRUCTION OFRESPONSIBILITYIN CRIMINAL LAW

2295

B. The Debate Over ChemicalDependency as a Disease
Judge Leventhal's approach to the problem of chemical
dependence and criminal responsibility proceeds from his view that
incapacity and indisposition can be distinguished in the law through
the use of medical evidence. This position turns on a particular
understanding of what constitutes an illness. Much has been written
1 83
about the "disease model" of alcoholism and drug addiction.
Given Leventhal's reliance on the disease model as it relates to
other psychiatric conditions, it is worth examining the contours of
this literature in order to unpack the claims he makes regarding the
distinguishability of diseases which qualify as excuses in the criminal
law from those which do not.

its opposite, indeterminism, is so obviously flawed as a matter of basic metaphysics.
While there has been a continuing debate among physicists on this point, with some
arguing for a theory of essential randomness-see e.g., ERNST CASsIRER, DETERMINISM
AND INDETERMINISM IN MODERN PHYSICS: HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC STUDIES OF

THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY (0. Theodor Benfey trans., 1956)-all seem to agree that
causation enters the picture at some point in the process leading to events in the
physical world.
In any case, human actors generally experience themselves and others as the
authors of their own actions. Choice and free will, in other words, represent our
subjective experience of daily reality. See Knight, supra note 1, at 255. Therefore,
while judges Wright and Leventhal may have been correct in urging the criminal law
to employ one perspective (the subjective intentionalist account) in most instances
and to save the other (the objective causal account) for cases where responsibility
should not attach, they both were mistaken in their efforts to identify a factual basis
for the mechanism by which that shifting perspective is to be mediated.
183 Perhaps the classic description of the disease model is contained in E.M.
JELLINEr, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM (1960). For further information on
the disease model as it relates to alcoholism, see MARTY MANN, NEW PRIMER ON
ALCOHOLISM (1958); Blume, supra note 90; Stanley E. Gitlow, Alcoholism: A Disease,
in ALCOHOLISM: PROGRESS IN RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 1 (Peter G. Bourne & Ruth
Fox eds., 1973); Mark Keller, The DiseaseConcept ofAlcoholism Revisited, 37 Q.J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 1694 (1976); Norman E. Zinberg, Alcohol Addiction: Toward a More
Comprehensive Definition, in DYNAMIC APPROACHES TO THE UNDERSTANDING

AND

TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM 97 (Margaret H. Bean & Norman E. Zinberg eds., 1981).
For a similar perspective on drug addiction, see Nathan B. Eddy et al., Drug
Dependence: Its Significance and Characteristics,32 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 721
(1965); Jerome H.Jaffe, Drug Addiction and DrugAbuse, in PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS
OF THERAPEUTICS 285 (Alfred G. Gilman et al. eds., 8th ed., 1990).
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1. The "Disease Model" of Addiction and Alcoholism
While there is considerable terminological confusion regarding
addiction to, and abuse of, alcohol and other drugs, 184 stable
diagnostic models do exist, and are widely accepted. Alcoholism,
for example, has been recognized as a medical disorder since 1951
by the World Health Organization.1 8 5 Similarly, the American
Psychiatric Association has, since 1953, included alcoholism in every
edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.18 6
Much remains to be learned about alcohol abuse and alcohol
dependence. Nevertheless, a review of the literature does yield a
rather coherent picture. It is clear, for example, that drinking does
not inexorably lead to alcoholism. Although estimates put the

184 See supra note 5.
185 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES 198
(9th rev., vol. 1, 1977) (setting forth the features of"alcohol dependence syndrome").
186 See AM. PsYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 173-75 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R] (defining
alcohol dependence and alcohol abuse). A widely employed definition of alcoholism
has been jointly formulated by the National Council on Alcoholism and the American
Medical Society on Alcoholism. This definition provides that:
Alcoholism is a chronic, progressive, and potentially fatal disease. It is
characterized by tolerance and physical dependency or pathologic organ
changes, or both-all the direct or indirect consequences of the alcohol
ingested.
1. "Chronic and progressive" means that the physical, emotional, and
social changes that develop are cumulative and progress as drinking
continues.
2. "Tolerance" means brain adaptation to the presence of high
concentrations of alcohol.
3. "Physical dependency" means that withdrawal symptoms occur from
decreasing or ceasing consumption of alcohol.
4. The person with alcoholism cannot consistently predict on any
drinking occasion the duration of the episode or the quantity that will be
consumed.
5. Pathologic organ changes can be found in almost any organ, but
most often involve the liver, brain, peripheral nervous system, and the
gastrointestinal tract.
6. The drinking pattern is generally continuous but may be intermittent, with periods of abstinence between drinking episodes.
7. The social, emotional, and behavioral symptoms and consequences
of alcoholism result from the effect of alcohol on the function of the brain.
The degree to which these symptoms and signs are considered deviant will
depend upon the cultural norms of the society or group in which the person
lives.
Frank A. Seixas et al., Definitionof Akoholism, 85 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 764, 764
(1976).
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number of alcoholics in the United States at between nine and ten
million, the best data suggest that this represents only about 5% to
187
10% of all those who begin drinking socially.
Typically, alcoholism emerges over an extended period of time.
As it progresses, the drinker gradually becomes physically dependent on alcohol.
Many alcoholics, for example, develop an
increasing tolerance to the substance, which drives them to ingest
larger and larger amounts.18 8 In addition, a number experience
anxiety, nausea, and nervous system disorders upon its withdrawal. 1 8 9

The alcoholic's dependence, however, does not derive solely

from his or her physiological reaction to alcohol. Experts also
describe a psychological component known as "alcoholic denial,"
which is "a clinical phenomenon ...

so widely assumed that

researchers do not even investigate its presence in most samples." 1 One practitioner has explained that:
[d]enial is an unconscious mental mechanism (unlike lying) by
which an individual protects himself from recognizing his
increasing need for alcohol and from being aware of the oftendevastating (sic) consequences of its use. Denial is a primitive
defense mechanism that all people have and may regress to in
order to safeguard themselves against the recognition of something which is threatening to their well-being ....
Denial is a
universal characteristic of alcoholism, and is inevitably present in
the alcoholic.

191

Taken together, the physical compulsion resulting from
tolerance and withdrawal and the psychological consequences of
denial lead alcoholics to a state in which they are unable to regulate
their drinking. This inability (or impaired ability) of the individual
187 See Criteria Committee, National Council on Alcoholism, Criteria for the
Diagnosis of Alcoholism, AM.J. PSYCHIATRY, Aug. 1972, at 127, 128.
88 See Michael J. Walsh, The Biochemical Aspects of Alcoholism, in ALCOHOLISM:
PROGRESS IN RESEARCH AND TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 43, 44-51.
189 See Maurice Victor & Sidney M. Wolfe, Causationand Treatment of the Alcohol
WithdrawalSyndrome, in ALCOHOLISM: PROGRESS IN RESEARCH AND TREATMENT, supra
note 183, at 137, 140-41.
190 Nemerson, supra note 6, at 407.
191 Brief of the National Council on Alcoholism at 20-21, Traynor v. Turnage, 485
U.S. 535 (1988) (Nos. 86-737 & 86-622) [hereinafter Brief of the National Council on
Alcoholism] (quoting from the affidavit of Dr. Ann Geller); see alsoMargaret H. Bean,
Denial and the PsychologicalComplicationsof Alcoholisr, in DYNAMIC APPROACHES TO
THE UNDERSTANDING AND TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM, supra note 183, at 55.
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to control his or her drinking, we are told, is the central definitional
19 2
feature of alcoholism.
The question why some drinkers, including some heavy drinkers,
retain the ability to regulate their consumption of alcohol while
others develop a loss of control has received considerable attention
from research physicians and social scientists. 195 This research
of
has revealed that the disease is produced by a shifting confluence 194
genetic/biochemical, environmental, and sociocultural factors.
Research on the genetic component has provided strong evidence
that there is an inherited predisposition to developing alcoholism,
and individuals with a family history of alcohol abuse or dependence
19 5
have been found to be at great risk of developing the disease.
192 See; e.g., Mark Keller, DefinitionofAlcoholism, 21 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 125,128

(1960) (explaining that "loss of control" is the sine qua non of alcoholism); Brief of
the National Council on Alcoholism, supra note , at 20 (describing alcoholism as
"something over which... [the alcoholic drinker] is [un]able to exercise conscious
control").
193 For a good overview of this research, see Bruce Bower, Alcoholism's Elusive
Genes, 134 Science News 74 (1988); Bruce Bower, IntoxicatingHabits, 134 Sci. NEWS
88 (1988).
194 See SHELDON ZIMBERG, THE CLINICAL MANAGEMENT OF ALCOHOLISM (1982).
195 In 1970, a family study in St. Louis was conducted on 259 hospitalized
alcoholics. Researchers interviewed first-degree relatives (parents, children, siblings)
of the alcoholic patients and found that 50% of the male first-degree relatives were
also alcoholic. See George Winokur et al., Alcoholism: III. Diagnosis and Familial
PsychiatricIllness in 259 Alcoholic Probands,23 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 104 (1970).
Another study focused on half-siblings, and made comparisons between children of
alcoholic parents and children without an alcoholic parent who were raised in foster
homes with an alcoholic parent figure. In each instance, the relative influence of
having a biologic alcoholic parent as opposed to having lived with an adoptive
alcoholic parent figure predominated in relation to the development of alcoholism.
See Marc A. Schuckit et al., A Study of Alcoholism in Half Siblings, 128 AMER. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1132 (1972).
Although research on the genetic component of alcoholism has not been able to
determine precisely what it is in an individual's genetic makeup that predisposes him
or her to the disease, see Bower, Alcoholism's Elusive Genes, supra note 193; Bower,
IntoxicatingHabits,supranote 193, there is evidence that physical abnormalities in the
way these individuals metabolize alcohol may play a role. See Marc A. Schuckit &
Vidamantas Rayses, Ethanol Ingestion: Differences in Blood Acetaldehyde Concentrations
in Relatives of Alcoholics and Controls, 203 SCI. 54 (1979). This theory is currently
being investigated to understand more fully the biochemical nature of alcoholism.
See Donald W. Goodwin, Alcoholism and Heredity: Update on the Implacable Fate, in
ALCOHOL, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY REVISITED 162 (Edith L. Gomberg et al. eds., 1982).
It is important to note that most of the research on alcoholism that has been
undertaken over the years has involved male subjects. Recent studies suggest that the
risk factors and progression of the disease for women may be quite distinct from
those identified for men. See LindaJ. Penniman &Jacqueline Agnew, Women, Work
and Alcohol: State of the Art Reviews, 4 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 263 (1989).
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In addition, an individual's environmental and sociocultural background are also thought to contribute to the development of
alcoholism. For example, in societies where drinking is socially
accepted, biologically predisposed individuals tend to be vulnerable
to the disease, while in societies which encourage total abstinence
1
from alcohol, alcoholism is relatively rare. 9
The literature presents a similar clinical picture of other forms
of substance abuse and dependence, including narcotics addiction.
Here again, professional organizations such as the American
Psychiatric Association 19 7 and
the World Health
Organization19 8 have long recognized drug addiction as a diagnosable and treatable illness.
As with alcohol, only a subset of those who use narcotics
ultimately become dependent and fall into a compulsive pattern of
abuse. 19 With respect to those users who do develop an addiction, the pattern closely resembles that described for alcoholism.
Thus, a gradually increasing physical dependence driven by the twin
engines of tolerance and withdrawal, along with the psychological
effects of denial, render the drug addict incapable of controlling his
2° °
or her ingestion of the substance.
196 See ZIMBERG, supra note 194, at 12-14. Significant differences have been found
to exist as well between ethnic and religious groups within a single culture. See id.
197 See DSM-III-R, supra note 186, at 177-79 (cocaine dependence), 182-83 (opioid
dependence).

8 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. EXPERT COMM. ON ADDICTION-PRODUCING DRUGS,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES No. 273, THIRTEENTH
REPORT, at 13 (1964).
1
' See Beryl A. Gerber, Non.Dependent Drug Use: Some PsychologicalAspect, in
SCIENTIFIC BASIs OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 375 (Hannah Steinberg ed., 1969); Denis Hill,
Chairman'sIntroduction, in SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE, supra, at 288.

2°°Judge Wright in the Moore case cites the World Health Organization's
definition of heroin addiction as "[t]he most widely accepted and authoritative
definition." United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright,
J., dissenting). That definition lists the following characteristics:
(1) an overpowering desire or need to continue taking the drug and to
obtain it by any means; the need can be satisfied by the drug taken initially
or by another with morphine-like properties; (2) a tendency to increase the
dose owing to the development of tolerance; (3) a psychic dependence on
the effects of the drug related to a subjective and individual appreciation of
those effects; and (4) a physical dependence on the effects of the drug
requiring its presence for maintenance of homeostasis and resulting in a
definite, characteristic, and self-limited abstinence syndrome when the drug
is withdrawn.
Id. (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORG. EXPERT COMM. ON ADDICTION-PRODUCING DRUGS,
supra note 198, at 13). The DSM-III-R indicates that withdrawal may not apply to the
abuse of or dependence upon cannabis, hallucinogens, or phencyclidine (PCP). See
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Theories as to the etiology of drug addiction also parallel those
developed in the alcoholism area. There may be no single universally accepted account of the causes of drug abuse and dependence, 20 1 but most experts do recognize that a complex process
of genetic, biochemical, psychological and cultural factors is at
work.20 2 To be sure, slightly different elements are thought to be
present, depending upon the type of substance to which a given
individual is addicted. All the same, the alcoholic or addict is
almost always presented as suffering from a diagnosable illness
caused not by his or her simple choice, but by factors beyond the
individual's conscious control.
2. Criticisms of the "Disease Model"
Given this understanding of the etiology and progression of
alcoholism and drug addiction, and given the medical community's
acceptance of these conditions as diseases, Judge Leventhal's claim
as to the evidentiary unreliability of Moore's proposed addiction
defense 203 would seem to be unpersuasive. Nevertheless, other
commentators who have focused on the relationship between
medical and legal notions of responsibility have come to a similar
conclusion. Perhaps the most forceful spokesperson for the view
that recognition of a medicalized conception of addiction should
not be allowed to undermine the criminal responsibility of addicts
2 4
and alcoholics is Herbert Fingarette. 0
In much of his work in this area, Fingarette has taken on the
notion (or as he describes it, the "myth"20 5) that alcoholism and

DSM-III-R, supra note 186, at 176-77, 179, 183; see also Joan E. Zweben &J. Thomas
Payte, MethadoneMaintenance in the Treatment of OpioidDependence, 152 W.J. MED. 5
(1990) (describing the use of methadone as a substitute for heroin and to prevent
withdrawal).
20' See Fingarette, supra note 5, at 433-43.
202 See Zweben & Payte, supra note 200, at 589-90; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG.
EXPERT COMM. ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SERIES No. 775, TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT (1989) (offering a collection of the
scientific literature on drug dependence).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 179-181.
204 See HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAvY DRINKING: THE MYrH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A
DISEASE (1988) [hereinafter FINGARETTE, HEAvY DRINKING]; Fingarette, supra note 5;
Herbert Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a FactualFoundationfor the
'Disease Concept ofAloholsn," 83 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1970) [hereinafter Fingarette,
Perils]. For a more general presentation of Fingarette's views regarding individual
autonomy, see HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE SELF IN TRANSFORMATION: PSYCHOANALYSIS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT (1963).
205 Fingarette's subtitle to his most recent book-"The Myth of Alcoholism as a
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drug addiction are diseases. To a significant extent, this debate
turns on semantics, especially with respect to different definitions
of the terms "disease" and "addiction."2 °
Considerably more
interesting are Fingarette's views regarding the lack of volition or
free choice claimed by alcoholics and addicts as grounds for their
exculpation from criminal responsibility. Fingarette's argument
proceeds in several steps, and each is worth independent consideration.

First, assuming that alcoholism and addiction are diseases,
Fingarette asserts that not all phenomena associated with diseases
2 °7
can "be usefully adapted to the context of a legal argument."
All too often, commentators, judges and lawyers who have pressed
for recognition of a loss-of-control defense for chemically-dependent defendants have limited themselves to arguing that conduct
which is "part of" or "symptomatic of" a disease is not culpable and
therefore ought not be subject to punishment. 20 8 Fingarette
properly points out that this sort of truncated argument is obviously
correct only insofar as it relates to behavior which is involuntary and
20 9
not the product of the actor's autonomous will.
Of course, those arguing for recognition of a new addiction
defense draw an important inference: that behavior inexorably
Disease'-is evidence of Fingarette's commitment to his position. FINGAREr, HEAVY
DRINKING, supra note 204.
206 See, e.g., Fingarette, supra note 5, at 420-22 (arguing that a lack of consensus
about the meaning of the terms 'disease" and "addiction" make the claim that
addiction is a disease unsuitable as a premise in the argument for legal reform). See
also injra text accompanying notes 230-30.
2° Fingarette, supra note 5, at 420.
2M See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The use

and incidental possession of narcotics are invariable symptoms of addiction."); Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 569 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("[A] person may not he
punished if the condition essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the
pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the
disease."); cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) ("Even one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common
cold.").
20 Fingarette acknowledges that "autonomous somatic states" and "autonomous
mental phenomena," or what the Robinson majority calls the "status" of being an
addict, 370 U.S. at 666, are beyond punishment as a constitutional matter. See
Fingarette, supra note 5, at 422. There is considerably less certainty about the
constitutionality of punishing an individual for the "condition" of being under the
influence of intoxicants. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality
opinion) (holding that criminal punishment for public intoxication does not violate
the Eighth Amendment); cf. State ex rel. Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va.
1982) (holding that criminal punishment for public intoxication violates state
constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
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related to an illness or disease necessarily emanates from causal
factors distinct from or beyond the person of the actor.2 10 It is
at this point-where involition and disease coincide-that Fingarette's
formulation of the problems generates its greatest leverage. He
drives a wedge between the notions of disease and involition by
asserting that "[t]here is no reason to assume that whatever is a
medically recognized symptom must be legally involuntary. A
211
symptom is simply an indicator or manifestation of disease."
Once he has separated the concepts of involition and disease,
the next step in Fingarette's formulation is to attack the loss-ofcontrol thesis that is so elemental to his opponents' point of view.
To accomplish this, he identifies a number of "aspects of drug use
that belie th[e] myth [of loss of control]." 212 The first is that
many users of narcotics and alcohol manage to avoid addiction
altogether, 213 a fact that presumably leads Fingarette to the
conclusion that there is something about the addicted individualhis or her character or personality-that contributes to his or her
abuse of, and dependence upon, drugs or alcohol.2 14
Next,
Fingarette argues that many former addicts and alcoholics are able
to alter their patterns of behavior and give up the use of drugs and
alcohol, either through treatment or self-help. 215 The conclusion
he wishes to draw here is that addicts do not suffer from a complete
loss of control, because a significant number are able to exercise
choice in overcoming their reliance; 216 in fact, he reports, the
principal methodology for treatment of addictions and alcoholism
210 See Blume, supra note 90, at 473-74; cf. Patricia M. Wald,Judicial Activism in
the Law of CriminalResponsibility: Alcohol Drugs, and CriminalResponsibility, 63 GEo.
L.J. 69, 84-85 (1974) (arguing that, regardless of medical uncertainties, ajury ought
to be empowered to decide in individual cases whether an alcoholic or addicted
defendant was unable to resist committing the crime).
211 Fingarette, supra note 5, at 423.
212 Id. at 428.
213 id.
214 Significantly, the same data are cited by advocates of the disease model to
show that the addict or alcoholic is not responsible for developing his or her
addiction. In these accounts, genetic and environmental factors that vary from
person to person, and are beyond an individual's conscious control, are identified as
determinative. See supra text accompanying notes 184-202.
215 See Fingarette, supra note 5, at 429.
216 See FINGARETTE, HEAvY DRINKING, supra note 204, at 59 (finding that
"abundant studies show that drinkers who suffer physical symptoms of withdrawal will
often, and of their own volition, refrain from drinking").
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involves reinforcing the responsible decision-making capacity of
patients.2 17
Perhaps the most important point, however, is Fingarette's view
that physiological addiction (especially as it relates to the joint
phenomena of tolerance and withdrawal) is a less powerful
determinant of addictive behavior than what he terms the "wide2 18
spread influence of social and psychological inducements."
While the data on this last point are subject to a variety of interpretations,2 19 its accuracy as an empirical matter is far less critical
than the assumptions it reveals as to Fingarette's view of human
nature.
In a curious way, Fingarette returns us to Judge Wilkey's
formulation of addictive behavior as a product of the interplay
between an addict's "physical craving" and his or her "strength of
Wilkey argued that even if physiological determicharacter." 220
nants of behavior are beyond the scope of the criminal law's
blaming practices, the forces that go to make up an actor's "character" are not. Fingarette takes a further step in this direction by
suggesting that virtually all behavior, including that undertaken in
conjunction with powerful physiological processes like exhaustion
or hunger, is mediated by the mind and reflects "considerations of
reasons and preferences." 22 1 In Fingarette's view, this operation
of the actor's capacity to consider preferences and alternatives,
which is present even in the case of an addicted or alcoholic
222
individual, makes him or her a responsible moral agent.
Moreover, to the extent that these rational calculations are influenced by the actor's environment, holding a substance abuser
an "effective tool" in
responsible for his or her behavior becomes
22
3
use.
alcohol
and
drug
deterring future

217 See id. at 109-11; Fingarette, Perils,supra note 204, at 806-07.
218 Fingarette, supra note 5, at 428; see generally id. at 431-33. Indeed, Fingarette's
reconceptualization of the problem asserts that "heavy drinking" is a "way of life."
FINGARETrE, HEAVY DRINKING, supra note 204, at 99.
f
219 Compare the authorities cited in Fingarettc, supra noteS, at 431-32 with those
cited supra note 195.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 164-64.
221 Fingarette, supra note 5, at 435.
f
2n Note the strong affinity between Fingarette's characterization and Michael
Moore's revised principle of responsibility. Seesupra text accompanying notes 69-79.
2" See Fingarette, supra note 5, at 432.
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3. The Fundamental Incompatibility of Medical and
Legal Models of Behavior
Ultimately, commentators like Fingarette and advocates of the
"disease model" find themselves in a standoff because they bring to
the question of how human behavior is produced radically different
notions of causation and choice. In general, the medical and
behavioral sciences assume that events are determined by a
combination of antecedent conditions or causes that make them
inevitable. This scientific viewpoint holds that whenever something
happens it could not have been possible for it to have failed to
occur, given the unique set of antecedent factors that produced
it. 2 2 4 Within this deterministic perspective the concepts of "free
will" and "volition" are simply meaningless. When a person finds
himself or herself in a situation where alternative courses of conduct
appear available, the scientific viewpoint asserts that the actor's
"choice" is determined by the complex of antecedent factors that go
to make up that individual's unique genetic, biological, and
225
experiential history.
Seymour Halleck has described the predominance of this
determinist perspective within the medical profession, providing a
useful summary of the divergent assumptions and goals that
separate legal and medical models of responsibility and excuse
giving. 226 Halleck explains that the determinist cast of the medical model leads it to employ a fundamental utilitarianism in which
considerations of desert rarely, if ever, enter into a doctor's
treatment plan. 227 The legal model, by contrast, assumes that
human actors possess the capacity to choose to engage in or refrain
from untoward conduct. In the legal realm, free will is presumed,
and only extremely limited opportunities are afforded for rebutting
224 According to this model, no event can occur in defiance of the scientific laws
of nature. Such an event, if it were to occur, would be a miracle.
2 For a definition of determinism, seesupranote 1. With respect to the criminal
law's practice of distinguishing between uncoerced conduct and that which is
compelled (including, for example, acts undertaken at gunpoint), some determinists
might argue that both categories of behavior are caused, but that conduct within the
latter category is easier to predict because its determinative antecedents are so dearly
observable. In this sense, all "choices" are determined, but the ones that are excused'
are those most obviously related to the actor's abnormal physiology or unusual
reinforcement history. For one account of this sort of"ignorance determinism," see
Moore, supra note 4, at 1118-19.
26 See Seymour Halleck, Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and Law:
UtilitarianPerspective, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 127.
27 See id. at 129.

A
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this presumption. 228 Significantly, the legal model is oriented
toward assigning blame and imposing punishment. This process is
normative in the sense that punishment ordinarily requires desert,
and even the criminal law's more utilitarian goals of deterrence,
isolation, and reformation tend to be circumscribed by some
229
conception of the offender's culpability.
At the operational level, physicians make calculations as to a
patient's responsibility by utilizing diagnostic criteria that go to
define various illnesses. 23 0 Halleck reports that doctors understand disease "to be present when a biological deficit is demonstrable." 23 1 In most cases, medical science can demonstrate the
presence of a physical abnormality in a diseased patient through the
use of clinical tests such as x-rays, blood tests and the like.
Psychiatric disorders, however, do not always lend themselves to this
sort of direct proof, and frequently are diagnosed on the basis of
23 2
abnormal or deviant behavior.
The fact that psychiatric disorders are principally discernable
through their behavioral component, and that they may be influenced by environmental factors ordinarily thought of as "under
(the] control of the will," 2 3 does lead many clinicians to experience a sort of ambivalence when withholding responsibility and
blame, which may not be present when treating other patients
presenting more "traditional" illnesses. 23 4 This division between
patients who are physically ill and those who are mentally ill has
begun to break down, however, as new evidence accumulates

associating virtually all psychological disorders with some biological
abnormality. 2 5 In addition, the current trend toward identifying
a behavioral component in many physical illnesses has made it
increasingly difficult for physicians to adhere rigidly to the view that
22 See Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39
RUTGERS L. REv. 377, 395 (1987).
2" See Halleck, supra note 226, at 128-29.
2" See id. at 129.
231 Id. at 133; see also Gerard, supra note 228, at 580-82.
232 See Halleck, supra note 226, at 133. Gerard points out that a similar process of
drawing inferences from behavior takes place on a regular basis within the criminal
law. See Gerard, supra note 228, at 405.
233 Halleck, supra note 226, at 133.
2
34 See id. at 133, 138; see also RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 235-73,337-81 (1986) (presenting and defending
detailed theories of autonomy and coercion for determining patients' abilities to make
responsible choices).
I See Halleck, supra note 226, at 133.

2306

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:2245

disease "happens to someone," and thereby absolves him or her of
23 6
responsibility.
The ambivalence experienced by treatment professionals is not
surprising given that they also live in a secular (that is, nonprofessional) environment in which blame and responsibility are ascribed
to all sorts of daily behavior. Regardless of one's professional
socialization, the everyday assumptions about choice and fault that
are deeply inscribed in our culture remain powerfully present for
each of us. 23 7 In its pure form, however, the medical model not
only avoids the ascription of responsibility for behavior that is
biologically determined, but also for behavior that the secular
culture (and the legal system) would describe as the product of the
actor's free will.
In summary, it is probably accurate to assert that the health care
system is dominated by a determinist perspective, whereas the
criminal law is dominated by-indeed, is central in the construction
of-an intentionalist perspective. Taking this distinction seriously
has the potential for yielding some powerful guidance to those
advocating on behalf of persons who are chemically-dependent.
The claim that addicted or alcoholic defendants should be entitled
to a loss-of-control defense in criminal prosecutions is bound to fail,
because it requires that a fundamentally intentionalist system
recognize an essentially determinist excuse. Instead, the problem
of chemically-dependent offenders ought to be recharacterized as
a health care matter rather than a criminal law matter, thus moving
these cases into an alternative system which itself is governed by
determinist assumptions. In the section that follows, an argument
for such a recharacterization is provided.
Before doing so, one final word is required. Michael Moore's
theory of responsibility helps to explain why some actors whose
conduct appears to be compelled manage to avoid criminal
punishment by way of the excuses of insanity, duress, and the
like. 238 On this view, the feature that distinguishes those cases
from the loss-of-control claims raised by chemically-dependent
defendants is that the former involve actors who are understood to
have been denied sufficient opportunity or to have lacked sufficient
cognitive capacity to engage in a process of practical reasoning. As
constructed within the criminal law, most addicted and alcoholic
236 See id. at 132.
237 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.

238 See supra note 71.
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defendants are not viewed in this way; rather, they are understood
to have had the opportunity and capacity for reflection. This has
been true in those cases where courts have acknowledged that the
single most powerful factor in determining a defendant's choice was
his or her physical or psychological need to possess or use drugs or
alcohol. An alternative approach, styling the addiction/alcoholism
defense as an excuse based on the actor's impaired capacity to
reason, might succeed, all other things being equal. The claim
would be that chemical dependency is more like insanity or infancy,
a status which so impairs practical reasoning abilities that it is fair
to question the very "personhood" of the actor. 239 All other
things are not equal, however, and a categorical expansion of this
kind would tend to undermine the law's constructional function.

24 0

239 See Moore, supra note 4, at 1149.
240 A better approach, at least in those cases where it is doctrinally plausible,
would be to attempt to introduce evidence as to the absence of a required specific
intent occasioned by the ingestion of drugs or alcohol. While a full examination of
this subject is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting the considerable
illogic and confusion that characterizes the general intent/specific intent dichotomy,
especially as it applies to intoxicated defendants. See MathewJ. Boettcher, Voluntaty
Intoxication: A Defense to Specific Intent Crimes, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 33 (1987); William
Roth, Generalvs. Specific Intenk: A Timefor TerminologicalUnderstandingin California,
7 PEPP. L. REV. 67 (1979); Alan R. Ward, MakingSome Sense ofSeif-Induced Intoxication,
45 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 247 (1986). These arcane rules, which relieve the State of its
obligation to prove mens rea in cases in which the charged offense is characterized
as one requiring only general intent, thereby creating a form of strict liability, are
illogical. They remove from the criminal proceedings precisely that inquiry which is
central to the construction of individual responsibility-the question of whether the
defendant was capable of engaging in a process of practical reasoning. See Nemerson,
supra note 6, at 423. Moreover, the doctrine in this area is remarkably incoherent.
In some jurisdictions, courts have gone out of their way to interpret the mens rea
element of an offense as not requiring a specific intent in order to deny to the
chemically-dependent defendant the opportunity to present evidence that his or her
intoxication prevented the formation of a required mental state. See, e.g., Linehan v.
State, 442 So.2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the crime of arson, which
requires that the defendant act "willfully," is not a specific intent crime). In
jurisdictions whose criminal statutes are based on the Model Penal Code, the specific
intent/general intent distinction is wholly inapplicable, having been rejected as an
organizational principle by the drafters of the Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
comment (Official Draft 1962) (noting that by defining the general requirements of
culpability by reference to "purpose," "knowledge," "recklessness," or "negligence,"
the Code avoids the confusion inherent in the common law categories). For a good
example of the poor fit between a Model Penal Code-derived offense and the specific
intent-general intent test, see People v. Register, 456 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982), affd, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. 1983).
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III. CRIMINAILZATION VERSUS MEDICALIZATION
In the Moore case, Judge Wright makes two critical missteps in
the course of setting out his approach to the problem of addiction
and criminal responsibility. The first, which has been considered
above, is that he fails to allow for the possibility that an individual
can simultaneously suffer from a drug- or alcohol-induced compulsion and still exercise meaningful choice. 241 The second, related
problem involves Wright's effort to limit the proposed loss-ofcontrol defense to offenses like possession, which are based upon
conduct that he understands to be "inseparable from the disease
242
itself."
As Judge Wilkey correctly notes, the logic that undergirds
Wright's acceptance of the addiction defense for possession-that
compelled conduct is not blameworthy because it is not attributable
to the free will of the actor-applies with equal if not greater force
to other offenses for which the addiction defense would be
unavailable. 243 If an addict is to be exculpated for possessing
narcotics because his or her disease is understood as having
compelled the proscribed conduct, it is difficult to discern any
logical reason for not exculpating the same addict in a prosecution
for theft or robbery, when that behavior is equally attributable to
the addict's compulsive need to obtain and use drugs. In fact, if we
accept the premise that conduct related to an addict's dependence
upon drugs or alcohol is evidence of his or her loss of control, the
individual who commits a robbery to obtain the money necessary to
241

See supra text accompanying notes 154-162.

United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1257 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Wright,J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
243 See id. at 1146-47 (Wilkey, J., plurality opinion).
242
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buy narcotics or alcohol may be deemed to be suffering from an
2
even greater compulsion than another who resists the same temptation. "
These two fissures in the logical structure of Judge Wright's
approach are related, because each proceeds from his attempt to
employ a causal analysis within a larger context that ordinarily
assumes choice and free will. Essentially Wright's position is that
some conduct, for example, possession of narcotics, is so fully
determined by factors beyond an actor's capacity to exercise
conscious choice that it no longer makes sense to speak of that
behavior as the individual's own. 245 Although this sort of a causal
account seems particularly plausible in relationship to chemical
dependency, inasmuch as the use of narcotics or alcohol by a
dependent individual is so often contrary to his or her self interest,
246
it is, in theory, available for every instance of human behavior.
Perhaps in recognition of this essential incompatibility between
traditional notions of criminal responsibility and determinist
theories of behavior, Judge Wilkey ultimately arrives at the
conclusion reached some time before by Justice Black in Powell v.
Texas, that "questions of 'voluntariness' or 'compulsion' should not
be 'controlling on the question [of] whether a specific instance of
247
human behavior should be immune from punishment.'"
In the nearly two decades since Moore, other state courts have
considered the question referred to them in general terms by justice
Marshall in the Powell case. With few significant exceptions, they
have declined to recognize any version of the involuntariness or
lack-of-choice defense pressed by alcoholic or drug-addicted
defendants. 248 The relative paucity of cases in which defendants
244

As Wilkey puts it, "if it is absence of free will which excuses the mere

possessor-acquirer, the more desperate bank robber for drug money has an even
more demonstrable lack of free will ... [which] derive[s] from precisely the same
factors as appellant argues should excuse the mere possessor." Id. at 1146 (emphasis
omitted). ChiefJudge Bazelon agreed with this criticism, yet he nonetheless joined
Judge Wright's opinion. Whereas the absence of non-arbitrary limits on the new
defense helped to persuadejudge Wilkey that no such defense should be recognized,
the same fact led Bazelon to argue that no limits of any sort should be imposed, and

that a loss-of-control defense ought to operate in all cases where a defendant is able
to show a drug- or alcohol-induced compulsion. Id. at 1260 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting
in part). For another indication of Chief Judge Bazelon's reasoning concerning
behavior produced by mental defect, see United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,

1022-34
245 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 161.
24
6 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
Moore, 486 F.2d at 1147 (WilkeyJ., plurality opinion) (alteration in original)
(quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 540 (1968) (Black, J., concurring)).
f
248 See e.g., State v. Herro, 587 P.2d 1181 (Ariz. 1978); State v. Smith, 219
247
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have pressed a loss-of-control defense, 249 together with the near
universal hostility accorded such arguments by the few courts to
reach the issue, 2 1 is significant evidence that a judicially created
involition doctrine is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable fu25 1
ture.
A.

The Link Between Substance Abuse and Crime

The foregoing conclusion is particularly striking in light of the
prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse within the population
generally and among those enmeshed in the criminal justice system
in particular. Indeed, given the sheer number of criminal defendants whose unlawful conduct is directly linked to their abuse of
addictive substances, it is remarkable that so few loss-of-control
claims have been raised, and so few accepted.
In 1987, out of a total of 12,711,600 criminal offenses charged
in the United States, fully 937,400 were for drug offenses, 616,700
for violation of state and local liquor laws, 828,300 for drunkenness,
and 1,727,200 for driving under the influence. 252 In addition, the
great majority of the 698,700 arrests for disorderly conduct and the
36,100 arrests for vagrancy also involved the abuse of drugs or
alcohol.2 53 Among those arrested for drug offenses, almost 75%
were for possession of controlled substances, rather than for their
254
sale or manufacture.
Nationwide, drug possession and trafficking offenses accounted
for nearly a quarter of all felony convictions in state courts in
1986.255
Within many localities the numbers are even more
overwhelming. In New York City, for example, drug offenses
accounted for 40% of all felony indictments in 1987,256 and in

N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 1974); People v. Davis, 306 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 973 (1974).
249 See generally Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Drug Addiction or RelatedMental

State as Defense to Criminal Charge,73 A.L.R. 3D 16 (1991) (collecting cases that have
ruled on the validity of the addiction defense).
2W See id.
25 On volition and criminal responsibility in general, see Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liability, 81 ETHICS 332 (1971); Kevin W. Saunders,
Voluntaiy Acts and the CriminalLaw: Justiying Culpability Based on the Existence of
Volition,
49 U. PrrT. L. REV. 443 (1988).
252

See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF

CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS-1988, at 481 (1989) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
25 See id. at 481, 515.
254 See id. at 518-19.
255 See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 941.
256
See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The CaseforLegalization,THE PUB. INTEREST, Summer
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Washington, D.C. in 1986, the figure stood at 52%.257 Estimates
are that 80% of the City Jail population in Baltimore is incarcerated
2 58
for drug-related crime.
Despite the enormous volume of drug prosecutions, those
arrested represent less than 3% of the nearly 40 million estimated
25 9
users of illegal substances in the United States in a given year.
Similarly, arrests for public drunkenness, vagrancy, disorderly
conduct, and driving under the influence reach only a small fraction
of those who regularly drink to intoxication. 26°
Thus, while
states, localities, and the federal government are spending a
considerable portion of their available resources to arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate substance-abusing offenders, 261 these expenditures are in all likelihood buying little in the way of deterrence or
262
incapacitation.
The link between substance abuse and crime goes far deeper
than that suggested by the arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates
for offenses such as narcotics possession and public drunkenness.
First, many users commit criminal offenses such as robbery and
burglary in order to obtain money for the purchase of drugs or
alcohol. In one recent study conducted in Miami, 573 narcotics
users were shown to have committed 6,000 robberies and assaults,
nearly 6,700 burglaries, and more than 46,000 other larceny and
fraud offenses in a single year.263 In addition, although most

1988, at 3, 16.
257 See PETER REUTER ET AL., GREATER WASH. RESEARCH CTR., DRUG USE AND
DRUG PROGRAMS IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 38 (1988).

258 See Legalization of Illicit Drugs-Impactand Feasibility,PartI: HearingBefore the
House Select Comm. on NarcoticsAbuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1988)
(testimony of the Honorable Kurt L. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore) [hereinafter
Legalization Hearings].
2 The percentage stated was derived from the number of drug offenses in 1987,
see supra note 252 and accompanying text, with the total number of users in 1985.
See NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE:
POPULATION ESTIMATES 1985, at 54 (1987).
260 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 252, at 374 (reporting the results of an October

1987 Gallup Poll on the percentage of Americans who abuse alcohol).
2" In 1986, for example, state and local law enforcement agencies spent an
estimated $5 billion on drug enforcement. This constituted about one-fifth of their
total investigative resources. See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 940. Similarly, in
1987, state and local governments spent $2 billion to confine convicted drug
offenders. See id. at 941.
22 See Oversight of FederalDrug Policy ProgramsAffecting State and Local Governments: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
85-87 (1989) (testimony of the Honorable Kurt L. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore)
[hereinafter
FederalDrug Policy Hearings].
265
See JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND
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chemically-dependent persons do not commit crimes other than
possession or use of illegal substances, 264 the abuse of drugs and
alcohol is significantly higher among criminal offenders than within
the general population. A 1986 study found that 43% of state
prisoners had used illegal drugs on a regular basis in the month
prior to their commission of the crime for which they were
incarcerated, 265 and 35% were under the influence of drugs at the
time of their commission of that offense. 266 Similarly, a 1983
survey found that 54% of inmates nationwide who had been
convicted of violent criminal offenses had ingested alcohol just
267
before committing their offense.
On the other hand, reliable data suggest that crime rates among
substance abusers decline dramatically when they enter treatment.
In Baltimore, for example, recent figures show that 63% of those
admitted to treatment had been arrested one or more times in the
twenty-four months preceding their admission; by comparison, the
268
arrest rate for those in treatment was only a little over 8%.
Despite the encouraging prospects for a reduced incidence of
criminal activity inherent in this connection between treatment and
crime rates, 269 the clear focus of public policy at the federal, state,
and local levels has continued to be on law enforcement.
Representative of this approach is the National Drug Control
Strategy announced by President Bush in September of 1989.270
Under that plan, 70% of the federal antidrug abuse budget was
earmarked for law enforcement, while only 30% was allocated for
treatment. 27 1 From a cost-benefit point of view, such an alloca-

POLICY 126 (1986).
' See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 941.

PUBLIC

265 See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, DRUG USE AND CRIME 6

(1988).
266 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 252, at 623.

267 See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 941; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 252, at 624.
It should be noted that more offenders use alcohol than illegal drugs. See BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 39 (1983).
268 See Legalization Hearings,supra note 258, at 189; see also INCIARDI, supra note
263, at 119.
"9 For additional discussion of the capacity of substance abuse treatment to
reduce the incidence of crime, see Henrick J.Harwood et al., The Costs of Crime and
the Benefits of Drug Abuse Treatment, in COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE:
RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 209, 232 (NIDA Research Monograph 86, 1988);
George Speckart & M. Douglas Anglin, Narcoticsand Crime, 3 BEHAV. ScI. L. 259, 266

(1985).
2 70

See NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 16.

271 See id. at 100.
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tion of resources is curious. As Kurt Schmoke, the mayor of
Baltimore, pointed out in recent testimony before a Senate
committee studying federal drug policy: "It costs Baltimore City
$20,000 to $30,000 dollars per inmate per year. We provide
effective drug treatment for $1,500 per person per year. I was
recently told that it costs less money (a lot less) to send someone to
272
Penn State than to the State Pen."
B. The Case ForPartialDecriminalization

The many problems associated with widespread substance abuse
and chemical dependency have been framed primarily as concerns
of the law enforcement system.27 3 This public policy decision has
applied not only to chemically-dependent actors whose conduct has
resulted in the victimization of others (in the form of theft offenses,
assaults, homicides, automobile accidents, and the like), but also to
crimes such as drug possession, vagrancy, and drunkenness, which
27 4
do not directly threaten the property or well-being of others.
An alternative policy is available, however, that would recharacterize the vast majority of addicts and alcoholics as patients to be
treated rather than as criminal offenders to be punished.2 7 5 Such
an alternative, which would take as its primary goal the reduction of
a wide range of harms associated with drug and alcohol abuse,
might be structured in a variety of ways. One possibility would be
to decriminalize possessory and public intoxication offenses 276 in
272

Federal DrugPolicy Hearings,supra note 262, at 95 (testimony of Honorable
Kurt L. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore).
27' These problems include increased incidence of motor vehicle accidents;
increased health costs and lost productivity on the part of workers; control of the

manufacturing and distribution of drugs by a criminal underworld; widespread
mislabeling and adulteration of illegal substances; the spread of AIDS; the use of
children as drug runners and drug dealers; and crimes of violence committed by
those engaged in drug distribution. In addition, the disintegration of whole
communities has been linked to the spread of drug and alcohol abuse. See
Legalization Hearings,supra note 258, at 188-98.
2 For a good overview of the contributions of various governmental actors to this
policy of enforcement, see Powell & Hershenov, supra note 16, at 565-80.
275 Of course, this need not be an either/or decision. There is no necessary

contradiction between holding addicted or alcoholic offenders criminally responsible
for their actions and offering them treatment in an effort to help them avoid such
actions in the future. As will be explained below, however, the combination of system

overload and targeted law enforcement associated with the "war on drugs" does push
in the direction of decriminalization. See infra, text accompanying notes 284-305.

276 See Legalization Hearings,supra note 258.
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order to direct more users into an expanded public health sys27 7
tem.
1. Decriminalization
The distinction between "decriminalization" and "legalization"
is important. A strategy of decriminalization relies upon a recharacterization of chemical dependency as a concern of the public health
system, and stresses the continuation and strengthening of regulatory controls governing the manufacture and distribution of addictive
substances. Legalization, on the other hand, grows out of libertarian concepts that press toward a more generalized deregulation of
278
the area.
277 Among the recommendations urged by Mayor Schmoke in his testimony to a

House committee studying the matter were the following1. United States drug policies and practices should be revised to ensure that
no narcotics addict need get his or her drug from the "black market".
a. Methadone maintenance should be expanded so that, under
medical auspices, every narcotics addict who applies for treatment
can receive it.
b. Other forms of narcotics maintenance, including cocaine and
heroin maintenance, should be made available, along with
methadone maintenance, under medical auspices. It will be up to
the physician to determine whether the person requesting
maintenance is an addict. Drugs will not be dispensed to nonusers.
c. End the requirement that persons be addicted for at least one
year before being eligible to enter a methadone treatment
program.
2. Ban all advertising of drugs including alcohol and tobacco.
5. Institute a clean needle exchange program as a way to reduce the spread
of AIDS.
6. The federal government should lead a coordinated approach to
adolescent drug education.
7. Develop community based programs designed to reach at-risk youths.
These would include education, employment and mentor programs.
Legalization Hearings,supra note 258, at 204-05. Other recommendations urged by
Schmoke included increased penalties for driving under the influence, and mandatory
jail terms for those who finance the importation and/or distribution of illicit drugs.
See id. at 206.
278 See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 939;James Ostrowski, Thinking About Drug
Legalization, 121 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1 (1989). Within a strategy of decriminalization,
the medical profession would be called upon to take over for the underground
markets that now provide manufacturing and distributing functions. Not only can
this approach be expected to minimize the risk of increased use, it would also address
the very real problems of adulteration, poor quality control, and mislabeling that
currently pose severe health threats to the thousands of illegal drug users in the
United States. See Ostrowski, supra,at 14.
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Because proposals to decriminalize possessory offenses draw the
same line as that proposed by Judge Wright in his Moore opinion,
they would appear to be subject to the sort of criticisms levelled by
Judge Wilkey against the proposed loss-of-control defense. If
addicts are to be exempted from criminal liability for possession, it
is difficult to understand why other chemically-dependent offenders
who commit offenses against persons or property in order to obtain
money to satisfy a compulsion to ingest drugs are not equally
2 79
blameless.
A satisfactory response, unworkable when applied to the linedrawing suggested by Judge Wright, is available in the present
context. The distinction adopted in Wright's Moore dissent between
possession and other offenses was meant to describe the boundaries
of criminal responsibility and excuse. In that context the limitation
was incoherent because the same loss-of-control logic urged as the
basis for granting an excuse for possessory crimes would apply
equally to offenses for which the new defense would be unavailable.
On the other hand, when framed as a question of criminalization,
the same distinction between possessory offenses and other crimes
can withstand Wilkey's criticism. In this context, the presence or
absence of liability does not rely on the actor's perceived ability to
exercise free choice, but on the whole range of societal considerations that inform legislative decisions about where to employ the
28 0
criminal law as an institution of social control.
There are, of course, risks associated with an approach that
would remove criminal law prohibitions against the possession and
use of addictive substances.2 8 1 The attendant potential benefits,

The situation with respect to alcohol abuse is somewhat different, since liquor
is now not an illegal substance. However, proposals like those offered by Mayor
Schmoke of Baltimore have two potential benefits. First, by stressing the health risks
associated with the abuse of addictive substances generally, the unfounded
distinctions now drawn with respect to the relative dangerousness of alcohol as
opposed to other substances would be undermined, and prevention efforts directed
to reducing alcoholism strengthened. Additionally, noncriminal regulations
governing the sale and distribution of alcohol, especially to minors, might be more
strictly enforced. See Legalization Hearings, supra note 258, at 201-02.
279See supra text accompanying notes 242-244.
280 For a discussion of criminalization, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
98 t Ethan Nadelmann has summarized the potential downside ofdecriminalization
in the following terms:
The impact of legalization on the nature and level of consumption of those
drugs that are currently illegal is impossible to predict with any accuracy.
On the one hand, legalization implies greater availability, lower prices, and
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however, are considerable. 2 2 For purposes of this article, the
likely consequences of greatest interest involve the operation of the
criminal justice system itself. A decision to redirect investigative,
prosecutorial, adjudicative, and correctional efforts away from mere
possession and intoxication would, in the first instance, go a long
283
way toward unburdening a dangerously overtaxed system.
Moreover, to the extent that a truly active public health system
would provide increased prevention, education, and treatment
resources, and might thereby reduce the abuse of drugs and alcohol
in the population generally, the number of offenses against persons
2 4
and property could be expected to diminish as well. 8
2. System Overload and Racial Disparity
Of even greater importance are the potential benefits of
decriminalization associated with the expressive and ideological
functions of the criminal law. At present there is widespread
noncompliance with the legal prohibitions against possession and
use of drugs. This sort of defiance has the potential to create a
corrosive cynicism, and to undermine the capacity of the legal
system to articulate and reinforce other important societal
norms. 285 The removal of these regularly disregarded prohibitions, and the attendant recharacterization of drug and alcohol

the elimination (particularly for adults) of the deterrent power of the
criminal sanction-all of which would suggest higher levels of use. Indeed,
some fear that the extent of drug abuse and its attendant costs would rise
to those currently associated with alcohol and tobacco. On the other hand,
there are many reasons to doubt that a well-designed and implemented
policy of controlled drug legalization would yield such costly consequences.
Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 943 (footnote omitted); see also Mitchell Rosenthal, In
Opposition to Drug Legalization,24 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 637, 648-53 (1991) (discussing
the potentially detrimental effects of decriminalization).
?12 Advocates of decriminalization have identified a long list of benefits likely to
flow from their proposals. They have included: taking the production and
distribution of drugs out of the hands of criminals; reducing the instances of addicts
using impure and mislabeled drugs; increasing tax revenues associated with the sale
of drugs; creating the opportunity to shape consumption patterns; reducing the
spread of AIDS; minimizing the victimization of children currently employed in illegal
drug dealing; and correcting the inconsistent messages now in place regarding the
relative dangerousness of alcohol and tobacco. See LegalizationHearings, supra note
258, at 30-41; David R. Henderson, A Humane Economist's Casefor DrugLegalization,
24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 655 (1991); Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 945; Powell &
Hershenov, supra note 16, at 600-09.
283 See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 941.
284 See Henderson, supra note 282, at 657-60.
285 See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 942.
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abuse as medical problems, might well ameliorate one significant
source
of the criminal justice system's current crisis of legitimacy 286
In addition, the legal system's ability to provide individualized
consideration for defendants, which in turn is central to the
system's ability to construct an ideology of individual responsibility,
has been adversely affected by the crush of cases generated by the
prevailing policy of criminalization. 28 7 For years, commentators
have expressed concern that the high volume of cases in the
criminal courts has created a harmful preoccupation with moving
cases and clearing dockets. 2 s The resulting tendency toward
"mass production" and away from individualized responses 28 9 is
fundamentally inconsistent with an institutional agenda that calls
upon the criminal law to construct compelling accounts of autonomous human behavior.2N
Here again, a preexisting weakness within the system has been
exacerbated by the decision to treat the problem of widespread
substance abuse primarily as a matter for the criminal law. The
system's capacity to generate intentionalist narratives has long been
in tension with its need to process cases efficiently. 291 As more
and more cases involving possession, public drunkenness, and the
like have come into the system, the balance has swung increasingly
toward a routinized process of adjudication and sentencing, in
286 On the crisis of legitimacy generally, see Mary S. Knudten et al., Will Anyone

Be Left To Testify? DisenchantmentWith The CriminalJusticeSystem, in THE NEW AND
THE OLD CRIMINOLOGY 207 (Edith E. Flynn andJohn P. Conrad eds., 1978). On the
special problems that exist with respect to the legitimacy of the system among people
of color, see 1 REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 37 (April 1991) [hereinafter N.Y. COMM'N ON MINORITIES
REPORT].

287 On criminal court congestion, see NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ON
TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS (1988); BARRY MAHONEY,
NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS: CASEFLOW
MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1988).
2
88 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 10-11 (1967) ("An inevitable
consequence of [high] volume [in the lower criminal courts] is the almost total
preoccupation in such... court[s] with the movement of cases.").
289 See Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., CriminalJusticeSystem: Overview, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 450, 454 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
2o See supra text accompanying notes 124-144 and accompanying text.
291 A particularly useful discussion of the tension between adversarial process and
system efficiency is presented in DAVID L. BAZELON, Counsel and Conscience, in
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW 170 (1987).
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which offenders are classified by type and evaluated according to
commonly-shared group characteristics.
This routinization has occurred throughout the system. At the
pretrial stage, for example, decisions with respect to bail frequently
are made on the basis of criteria such as "family stability" and
educational background, which result in a disproportionate
percentage of African American and Hispanic defendants being
denied pretrial release. 292 Similarly, as the pressures induced by
case overload increase, so does the system's reliance on negotiated
guilty pleas as a means by which charges are resolved. Here again,
a review of the plea negotiation process typical in many criminal
courts reveals that race-based factors play a meaningful role in
293
determining outcomes.
As David Bazelon has pointed out, the results of plea negotiations depend in large part on the efforts of competent counsel. As
more cases find their way into the criminal justice system, the
differential impact of inadequate assistance of counsel becomes
greater and "the burden of less effective advocacy falls almost
294
exclusively on a single subclass of society-the poor."
Finally, at the sentencing phase of the process, group characteristics have been found to affect significantly the punishment
received by defendants. A recent study by the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services found that African-Americans
292 See N.Y. COMM'N ON MINORITIES REPORT, supra note 286, at 38-39. In
addition, given the strong correlation between pretrial release and final disposition
of charges, this increased pretrial incarceration of defendants of color tends to result
in more convictions and longer sentences. See id.
29s3 See generally COMM'N ON MINORITIES REPORT, supra note 286, at 40 (describing

"invidious distinctions" in the plea offers made to white and African-American
defendants); RAYMOND J. MICHALOWSKI, ORDER, LAW, AND CRIME 210-15 (1985)

(examining the plea bargaining process in American courts).
294 BAZELON, supra note 291, at 172; see also MICHALOWSKI, supranote 293, at 21213 (arguing that poor defendants are more likely to be convicted than those who can
afford private attorneys because of the pressures on public defenders). Indeed, there
is good reason to believe that the incentive to plead guilty increases with the strength
of the defendant's case. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 60-61 (discussing the prosecutorial practice "of
bargaining hardest when the case is weakest"). In the absence of committed counsel
with adequate resources-a condition increasingly unavailable to poor Black and
Hispanic defendants-the likely consequence is that outcomes will depend more and
more on who the defendant is rather than what he or she has done. See Abraham S.
Blumberg, Lawyers with Convictions, in LAw AND ORDER: THE SCALES OF AMERICAN

JUSTICE 67-68 (Abraham S. Blumberg ed., 1973); cf. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the
Court" Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
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are much more likely to receive jail sentences than are white
defendants with similar backgrounds who have been convicted of
the same offenses. In one New York county, this study found that
white felony defendants with prior criminal records had a 39%
chance of being incarcerated, while essentially similar minority
95
defendants faced a 52% risk of incarceration.
The current criminal enforcement approach to drug and alcohol
abuse has fueled a related trend that has converged with case
overload to undermine the ideological functioning of the system.
Not only has the "war on drugs" greatly increased the volume of
cases in the system, thereby elevating an already-existing pressure
toward mass production, equally destructive of the system's
ideological functioning has been the targeting of people of color
living in inner cities as objects of that warY

25 See N.Y. COMM'N ON MINORITIES REPORT, supra note 286, at 41. The data also
suggest that white defendants who are incarcerated receive shorter sentences than
similarly situated African-American and Hispanic defendants. See id.
The relationship between race and sentencing has been the focus of much
recent scholarship. In one study, an author conducted a comprehensive examination
of racial discrimination in the criminal justice systems of California, Michigan and
Texas. In each of those states, she found that "judges typically imposed heavier
sentences on Hispanics and blacks than on whites convicted of comparable felonies
and who had similar criminal records. Not only did these minorities receive harsher
minimum sentences but they also served more time." Joan Petersilia, Racial
Disparitiesin the CriminalJustice System: A Summaty, 31 CRIME AND DELINQ. 15, 15
(1985); see also Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence is there that Race
Influences Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDICARE 111, 113 (1988)
(concluding that there is measurable discrimination against African-Americans in
police practices, prosecutorial practices, plea bargaining, and sentencing); Jim
Sidanius, Race and Sentence Severity: The Case of AmericanJustice, 18J. OF BLACK STUD.
273, 278 (1988) (concluding that racism accounts for disproportionate sentencing).
Other researchers have argued that the weight of available evidence contradicts
the conventional wisdom that widespread race discrimination exists in sentencing in
the United States. See, e.g., Gary Kleck, Lfe Support for Ailing Hypotheses: Modes of
Summarizingthe EvidenceforRacialDiscriminationin Sentencing, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
271 (1985). Still other writers have suggested that the influence of race on sentencing
is conditional upon other case-related attributes. SeeJames D. Unnever & Larry A.
Hembroff, The Predictionof Racial/EthnicSentencingDisparities:An Expectation States
Approach, 25 J. OF REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1988). Finally, some authors have
concluded that disparities in sentencing on the basis of race are reduced or
eliminated in jurisdictions that have adopted determinate sentencing schemes. See,

e.g., Marjorie S. Zatz, Race, Ethnicity,and DeterminateSentencing, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 147
(1984).
2 A number of law enforcement techniques that rely upon the group characteristics of suspects rather than upon individualized data as to particular conduct have
been adopted or used with increasing frequency as the drug war has heated up. All
of these techniques have targeted people of color. Powell and Hershenov, for
example, note that the use of drug courier profiles as a substitute for individualized
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The data on this point are simply overwhelming. Recent
studies have shown that as many as 90% of all those arrested for
drug-related offenses are African-American, despite the fact that the
National Institute on Drug Abuse places the percentage of AfricanAmericans within the general population of drug users at a
relatively low 12%.217 Moreover, given the characteristics of those
arrested and the growing percentage of drug offenders in prison, it
should come as no surprise that over 50% of all inmates in the
United States are African-American. 29 As reported by the Federal Sentencing Project, nearly one-quarter of all African-American
2
men are under the supervision of the criminal justice system.
As long ago as 1977, two respected anthropologists who conducted
a cross-cultural study of criminal law described the prison system in
the United States as a "model... of internal colonialism. "30 The
realities of our current drug war have made their observation even
30
truer today. '
decision making on the part of the police has made African-Americans particularly
subject to unjustified police harassment. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 16, at
582-85. See also Joseph F. Sullivan, New Jersey Police Are Accused of Minority Arrest
Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at B3 (citing statistics showing that 80% of
highway arrests involved African-American males driving late model automobiles or
automobiles with out-of-state plates, while less than 5%of all traffic met that profile).
The use of such profiles has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, see United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), despiteJustice Marshall's observation in dissent
that such profiles result in subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police
harassment and detention. See id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similarly, the
increasingly popular practice of neighborhood sweeps, which involve the rounding up
of large numbers of African-American males without individualized determinations
of reasonable suspicion, has moved the system away from considerations of conduct
and toward labelling people on the basis of their characteristics and circumstances.
See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 16, at 584, 613-14; see also Randolph N. Stone,
'War on Drugs,"Crime Fought on Wrong Battlefields, CHI. DEFENDER, Oct. 31, 1989, at
42 (arguing that the ongoing "war on drugs" presents a serious threat to the AfricanAmerican
community).
297
See id. at 610.
298 Indeed, in the state of New York over 80% of state prison inmates are people
of color; in New York City the figure is 95%. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 16,
at 610-11.
29 See id. at 611.
M0 Laura Nader & Elaine Combs-Schilling, Restitution in Cross-CulturalPerspectiv4
in RESTITUTION INCRIMINAL JUSTICE 13, 28 (Joe Hudson ed., 1975). Indeed, a new
study conducted by the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives found that,
on any given day in 1991 in Washington, D.C., 42% of all African-American men
between the ages of 18 and 35 were enmeshed in the criminal justice system. See
Jason DeParle, 42% of Young Black Men are in Capital'sCourt System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1992, at Al. The study also found that as many as 70% of African-American men
in Washington are arrested by the time they turn 35, and that up to 85% are likely
to be arrested at some point in their lives. Id.
301 For a good discussion of institutional racism within the criminal law prior to
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3. The "War on Drugs" and Distorted Discourse
These figures raise serious questions regarding the evenhandedness of the "war on drugs." 0 2 Also troubling are the effects that

the current war on drugs, see Gwynne Peirson, Institutional Racism and Crime
Clearance, in BLACK PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND THE CRIMINALJUsTICE SYSTEM 107
(Robert L. Woodson ed., 1977).
0 Of particular note in this regard is a recent decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in which a Minnesota sentencing statute was found to be violative of the state's
constitution because it punished the possession of cocaine base more severely than
possession of cocaine powder. The court noted the findings of the trial judge that
crack cocaine is used predominantly by African-American defendants, while cocaine
powder is used more often by whites, and on those grounds held that the statute
discriminated unfairly on the basis of race. See State v.Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887
(Minn. 1991). Significantly, the Minnesota legislation was preceded by a federal
statute which equates 100 grams of cocaine powder and one gram of cocaine base for
the purpose of determining punishment. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207-2 (Oct. 27, 1986) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)). The federal provision has withstood a number of federal constitutional
attacks. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the Sentencing Guidelines of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act did not violate
due process and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 974 (1991); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d
975 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the section of drug quantity and drug equivalent
tables for determining sentencing levels did not violate substantive due process and
the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that Federal Sentencing Guidelines for possession of "cocaine base"
(crack) did not violate the Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection).
A review of the history of criminalization, of which the "war on drugs" is but the
latest chapter, reveals that the United States has repeatedly employed criminal
prohibitions against addictive substances in order to aid in the subordination of
targeted groups within our society. The temperance movement of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, for example, served the interests of a xenophobic movement that
equated the dangers of alcohol with the unsettling activity of leftist union organizers
and others associated with a growing class of immigrant laborers. See JOSEPH R.
GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963); JOHN J. RUMBARGER, PROFITS, POWER, AND
PROHIBmON (1989); Harry G. Levine, The Alcohol Problem in America: From
Temperance to Alcoholism, 79 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 109 (1984).
Similarly, the first criminal provisions against the use of opium in California in
the 1870s were the result of a virulent anti-Chinese sentiment fueled by job
competition between white workers and Chinese immigrants, following completion
of the railroads. The initial opium-smoking prohibitions were part of a larger
constellation of racist legislative activity designed to suppress the Chinese minority,
and were accompanied by sensationalist accounts of Chinese men taking advantage
of white women in opium dens. See DAVID E. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE:
ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973); ELMER C. SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1939); Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law:
Economic Crisis and Social Control, 8J. DRUG ISSUES 53, 54 (1978).
Even the Harrison Act of 1914, which was the first federal prohibition relating
to cocaine and the opiates, was passed on the heels of overblown media accounts that
depicted cocaine-crazed Blacks in the South and heroin-addicted Black prostitutes and
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such a targeted policy of law enforcement has upon the normative
foundation of our formal blaming practices. The popular images
that emerge from the daily operations of our criminal courts are
populated by stereotyped defendants regarded as "bad people"
3
because of who they are rather than what they may have done. 0
This trend is fundamentally at odds with the normative premise
upon which our blaming practices rests.
Longstanding notions of blameworthiness rely on the characterization of individual defendants as moral actors. This, in turn,
requires that we conceive of one another as free to make individual
decisions at odds with our circumstances. 3°4 A system that resolves cases according to the appearance of defendants, according
to their race and social class as much as their behavior, ultimately
is ill-equipped to construct and reinforce a common morality in
which people are thought of as deserving praise or blame on the

criminals in the cities. See MusTo, supra, at 7, 65. Here again, artificially created
fears about the supposed links between narcotics and a 'black rebellion" in the South,
and images of Black addicts raping white women were central to the hysteria that
found its way into legislative enactments. See id. Significantly, the class and racial
fears that ignited this earlier drug war developed at a point when the use of opiates
was spreading from white, middle-class women to younger African-American men.
See TROY DUsTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY (1970). This forms an important
historical parallel to the current round of drug hysteria, centered around the use of
crack cocaine by young African-American men. The social history of the last fifteen
years makes clear that a concerted law enforcement policy against the use of cocaine
was largely absent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when cocaine powder was a
popular amusement of those within the young, white, professional class. It was not
until the development of crack (a cheaper form of cocaine) made it possible for
residents of the Black inner city to become users that the dangers of this drug were
"discovered" and a punitive enforcement policy undertaken. Indeed, the Drug
Enforcement Agency has reported that the extent of crack use has been overemphasized relative to the use of other drugs. SeeJames A. Inciardi, Beyond Cocaine: Basuco,
Crack, and Other Coca Products, 14 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBs. 461, 482 (1987).
303 In their discussion of the "disproportionate focus of law enforcement on black
(and Latino) offenders," Powell and Hershenov provide what they term a "portrait"
of the "nation's predominant image of the drug problem":
gun-toting black teenage gangs, ghetto crack houses where unspeakable
horrors take place, and depraved black women who prostitute themselves
to raise money for their crack, and who give birth to tiny, drug addicted
babies whose pictures are plastered all over our subway cars in extravagantly

graphic public service messages warning of the dangers of drugs.
Powell & Hershenov, supra note 16, at 611 (quoting L. Siegel, The Criminalizationof
Pregnancy: A Paradigm of America's "Harm Maximization" Approach to Drug Use)
(unpublished memorandum prepared for the ACLU, on file with U.C. Davis Law
Review).
s04 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a CriminalPartsIII &9IV,87
COLUM. L. REv. 920, 934-36 (1987).
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basis of conduct undertaken in spite of their place in society.
Instead, a lurking determinist account begins to take precedence in
our collective consciousness. 0 5 We begin to see criminal defendants as objects rather than as persons, and the normative basis for
3 6
imposing punishment is lost. 0
Some attention to the discursive practices associated with
contemporary criminal blaming is required in order to comprehend
how the combination of system overload and a policy of racespecific law enforcement have functioned together to generate this
new form of blaming. Socially significant discourse can occur
through a wide variety of communicative acts. To the extent that

these acts take place in regularly recurring patterns, powerful
images may be set up that reinforce some ideas while obscuring
others. Thus, meaning may be conveyed by "a discursive process
through which aspects of existing practice are selected, emphasized,
refined, and formally discussed, while other aspects are ignored,
0 7
subordinated, dispersed, and relegated to the informal."
As noted earlier in this article, the adjudication of criminal cases
can be viewed as a kind of discursive process in which particular
interpretive constructs are employed in order to mediate an always
present intentionalist/determinist dualism. To the extent that this
sort of process is in place, we have seen that its effect, in the
5

See David Boaz, A Drug-FreeAmerica-Or a FreeAmerica?, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
617, 631-35 (1991) (arguing that the drug war, like the disease model of addiction,
has undermined notions of individual responsibility). Cf. Robin West, supra note 136,
at 175 (arguing that the tension between rights assertion and narrative must be
balanced in order to establish both individual responsibility for crime and societal
responsibility for the conditions feeding criminality).
06 Generally shared notions regarding individual choice and responsibility are
critical in shaping the behavior of all community members, and in encouraging
voluntary compliance with societal norms. A quick look at the actual reach of the
enforcement system makes this point dramatically. Of all criminal offenses
committed in the United States, only a small subset are reported to law enforcement
authorities, and an even smaller percentage are closed by arrest or prosecuted. See
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 252, at 427 (offenses known to police), 481 (estimated
number of arrests), 511 (offenses cleared by arrest). From the perspective of effective
social control, the notion that compliance generally can be coerced simply is
untenable. The more sensible view is that crime control is achieved through the
asuggestive
influence" of the criminal justice system. See Joseph S. Roucek, The
Concept of Social Control in American Sociology, in SOCIAL CONTROL FOR THE 1980'S,
3o

supra note 65, at 11, 12; see also, Nicholas N. Kittrie, Symbolic Justice-The Trial of
CriminalCases, reprintedin partin NICHOLAS N. KrrrmE & ELYCE ZENOFF, SANCTIONS,
SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS 182 (1981).
30 Dragan Milovanovic & Stuart Henry, Toward a New Penology: Constitutive
Penology, 18 SOc.JUsT. 204, 206 (1991).
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ordinary case, is to reinforce notions of individual autonomy and
free choice, while simultaneously obscuring the causal roots of
308
criminal behavior.
But what are the consequences for society when these interpretive constructs are no longer functional? What meanings are
communicated when the system continues to assign blame and
impose punishment without the benefit of individualized adjudications essential for the sorting out of intentionalist stories from
causal accounts?
A way into this maze has been provided by Robin West in a
recent article on the role of narrative in a different area of criminal
blaming, death penalty cases. 3°9 In West's account, lawyers and
judges engage in two kinds of discrete activity in the course of
trying and adjudicating cases. Some legal discourse takes the form
of rights assertion, while other discourse involves narrative or
storytelling. Essentially, West argues that storytelling can be
employed either to assign or withhold responsibility for an event,
while rights assertion is useful only to deny the relevance of
310
responsibility.
Applying this basic distinction to a recent line of Supreme Court
death penalty cases, West explains that the conservative majority on
the Court has adopted the practice of relying on narratives in order
to recount the story of a victim's death and to convey a defendant's
individual blame for the violent horrors detailed. By contrast, the
liberal justices' dissenting opinions in each case eschew any attempt
at narrative, relying instead on fairly standard rights analyses. In
West's terms, the failure of the liberals to construct counternarratives is significant, because it means that they are unable to
"respond to the need to assign responsibility for criminality itself,
whether to the defendant, society, or history.""' l The criminal
process is, in important respects, about blame and desert. By
refusing to engage in storytelling, the liberals are described as
ceding the field to the conservatives, whose narratives are limited to
3 12
highly individualistic notions of responsibility.
2
M8
See supra text accompanying notes 120-130.
$09 See West, supra note 136.

310 See id. at 167.

S31Id. at 174.
312 As West explains it: "[B]y eschewing both the narrative voice and themes of

responsibility, the liberals neglect an opportunity to construct an alternative
understanding of societal responsibility for criminality that might challenge the
unbridled individualism of the narrative account provided by the conservative
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West's account is an important first step in understanding how
adjudicatory narratives function. In her telling, the question is
whether narratives pressing toward the attribution of individual
responsibility are to be balanced with counter-narratives that make
possible an alternative understanding of societal responsibility for
criminal conduct.
When applied to the mass of cases brought into the system as a
consequence of the war on drugs, however, the analysis must
necessarily be modified, because neither the standard narrative nor
the urged counter-narrative is regularly offered. 1 3 Instead, we
are left with a sort of narrative vacuum that makes impossible the
articulation of either individual or societal notions of responsibility.
Moreover, this discursive vacuum has developed in a system that has
continued to assign blame and impose punishment on an enormous
number of criminal defendants drawn from distinct subordinated
3 14
populations.
This has contributed to the development of a remarkable
distortion of our traditional normative order. African-Americans
and Hispanics have long been overrepresented within the criminal
system.3 15 The drug war has had two effects: it has increased
that overrepresentation, and it has so overloaded the system that

majority." Id. at 175.

313 Articulation of the standard narrative requires that individualized adjudications
take place with sufficient regularity to create the perception that blame is being
assigned on the basis of freely chosen, autonomous conduct. See supra text
accompanying notes 304-306. An illustrative counter-narrative of the type which is
also not being generated has been offered by James Doyle:
A claim that [inner city] residents bear no responsibility for the drug
epidemic that plagues their communities would be ridiculous, but can it
possibly be true that the larger society bears no responsibility? Drugs are
valuable because they are scarce. They are scarce because they are
illegal.... In many areas of the [inner city], drugs are the only things with
value. The [inner city] has no goods or services, or at least so few that the
decision to traffic in drugs is an economically rational (even if morally
unattractive) decision. The economic conditions that have given rise to that
situation cannot be entirely a product of the [inner city] itself. The drugs
are not grown, or refined, or even, for the most part, wholesaled in the
[inner city]. Nevertheless, larger society tends to assume that the [inner
city] residents, so distant and different, have created the drug epidemic for
themselves.
James M. Doyle, Into the Eight Balk The Colonialists'Landscape in American Criminal
Justice, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 65, 93 (1992).
314 See supra text accompanying notes 289-300.
s5I See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND

MODERN DEMOCRACY 523-34 (1944).
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individualized adjudications are not always possible. With the
muting of individualized narratives, the overt characteristics of
criminal offenders, the features they tend to share, take on a special
salience. In the absence of any acknowledgement of a general
societal responsibility for involvement in the criminal system of
these discrete groups, their shared characteristics are, by necessity,
assigned moral significance.3 16 The end result is that AfricanAmerican and Hispanic offenders are themselves thought to be
responsible for the conditions that contribute to their criminality.

3 17

This state of affairs is distinguishable from that which led Judge
David Bazelon to consider a defense for "rotten social background."3 1 1 Central to Bazelon's analysis was the notion that a
defendant's deprived background might so impair his or her ability
to exercise free choice that he or she might be entitled to a
defense.3 19 Stephen Morse and others responded to this proposal
by pointing out that the presence of a correlation between social
deprivation and crime does not necessarily amount to a showing
that any particular defendant's power of choice has become
completely overborne by his or her environment. 320
Morse
acknowledged the causal pull of environmental factors, and
conceded that some choices are made more difficult by virtue of an
316 In Doyle's article, a California judge is quoted describing a defendant who
appeared before his court. Doyle points out that "[n]o effort is made to condemn
[the defendant], to weigh [his] motivations, or to consider [his] culpability.... The
activities of [the defendant] are not presented as matters of choice; they are described
as if they were in the nature of the organisms." Doyle, supra note 313, at 82 (emphasis
added).
Elsewhere, Doyle suggests that media references to the defendants in the
"Central ParkJogger" case as the "Central Park Wolfpack," carry implications beyond
the individual offenders. See id. at 83. Indeed he asks, "[d]o they imply that the
whole [inner city] population might someday 'revert' and go 'wilding?'." Id. at 84.
317 This conclusion is inconsistent with the principle of the transfer ofpowerlessness. See supra text accompanying note 34. More importantly, it helps contribute to
a state of affairs in which we may not be as troubled by the disproportionate number
of racial minorities in the criminal system as might otherwise be the case.
318 See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert

denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurringin part and dissentingin part);
Bazelon, supra note 81 at 398-401; Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law: A
Rejoinder to ProfessorMorse, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1976).
319 See Alexander, 471 F.2d at 961. Bazelon's opinion in Alexander contains a
considerable degree of ambivalence regarding this theory. In his subsequent articles
on the subject, however, Bazelon's claims became more forceful. See Bazelon, supra
note 81, at 398-401.
320 See Morse, supra note 81, at 1248-54.
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actor's social deprivation.3 21 Nevertheless, he argued that because
most poor persons are law-abiding, and because some wealthy
persons also break the law, rotten social background should not be
entertained as a new exculpatory factor in determining criminal
3 22
responsibility.
At root, the Bazelon-Morse debate is analogous to the debate
contained within the various opinions in the Moore case.3 23 In
both instances, complex human stories containing an amalgam of
intentionalist and determinist elements were being considered
within the context of an adjudicatory system in which individualized
decisionmaking was to be employed. Further, in both debates, the
exculpatory claims were rejected, at least in part, in reliance on an
adjudicatory process that is capable of generating intentionalist
3 24
stories while simultaneously submerging the causal account.
When the debate is undertaken within a narrative vacuum,
however, the mix of intentionalist and determinist features play out
quite differently. Now, a plainly visible correlation, between race
and poverty on the one hand and involvement in the criminal
system on the other, is left unaccounted for. We cannot depend on
the standard narrative to tell a story of free choice and individual
responsibility, and we are unlikely to hear counter-narratives that
assign responsibility to society generally for the link between social

deprivation and race that forms a thread running through many of
3 25
these cases.
In the Moore case, Judge Wilkey offered a depiction in which the
blameworthiness of a chemically-dependent offender's conduct is
figured by reference to the relationship between his or her strength
of character and his or her craving.3 26 As noted earlier, this
depiction emphasizes the intentionalist account by treating the
321 See id. at 1252.

32 See id. at 1259. Morse's response to Bazelon contains several other arguments
of a utilitarian nature, as well as the basic claim that the proposed defense would
deny the offender's very personhood. See id. at 1261-63.

23 See supra text accompanying notes 144-80.

24 It is worth recalling that the narrow legal issue in the Moore case concerned the
trial judge's refusal to allow expert testimony with respect to the "disease" of
addiction. In a gross sense, it is plain that this ruling helped to obscure or submerge
the causal account urged by the defendant, in that thejury was not allowed to hear
or consider the expert's testimony regarding compulsion. See supra note 145 and
accompanying text.
2 See generally Delgado, supra note 114. (discussing whether "Rotten Social
Background"
should be recognized).
326
See supra text accompanying notes 163-168.
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3 27
offender's strength of character as autonomous and intrinsic.
Similarly, it tends to submerge the causal account, despite an
acceptance of the notion that craving might be a determined
feature, by discounting the possibility that nonautonomous factors
might also play a significant role in the development of the
3 28
offender's character.
In a system in which individualized adjudications are not always
available to build an account of the offender's character out of the
data of his or her conduct, it becomes tempting to infer a blameworthy character from the offender's very presence in the system.
If this offender shares certain general characteristics with others in
the system-especially characteristics with respect to race and class3 29
the inference may become generalized to the whole group.
The claim is no longer that an individual defendant has made an
autonomous choice, within the context of his or her group affiliation and social environment, to engage in a course of criminal
conduct; rather the claim is that the defendant must have engaged
in criminal conduct because of that group affiliation and environ33 0

ment.

327 This is, of course, very similar to the set of analytic moves undertaken by
Frankfurt and Watson. See supra text accompanying notes 37-59. As noted earlier,
this notion of "character" is employed by thinkers who follow the work of David
Hume. According to this school of thought, conduct is understood as originating in
the "regularity of one's character," and is morally significant for that reason. See
Schlick, supra note 28.
328 See supra text accompanying notes 107-111.
32 Recently, ajudge in Florida gave public voice to this set of inferences. While
his comments led to his removal as chiefjudge, see In re Petition for Removal of a
ChiefJudge, 592 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1992), they were also met with considerable support
in the state. See Florida's Top Court DemotesStateJudgeforRacialRemarks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19,1992, at A16. As reproduced in the appendix to the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion in the case, the judge was quoted as saying in part:
[W]hy is [it] that 20 percent of the population is black and 45 percent of the
prisoners are black? That's because, goddamnit, they're the one's
committing the crimes. As I told you earlier, you've got more of those folks
involved in drugs than whites, as far as felonies are concerned. I don't
know how many of them are using, we have no way of knowing. Every day
the Times-Union reports another killing on the Northside. Every day. So
they are involved in crime. That's the reason. How do we stop them from
being involved in crime? We give them a mama and a daddy to start off
with. We give them a home with love and affection in to start off with. But
how do we go about doing that? It's impossible, if that's what they need.
Id. at 673-74.
"' The public's preoccupation with newspaper, television, and movie accounts of
crime, law enforcement, and punishment has reinforced this shift in perspective. See
generally Vicky Munro-Bjorklund, Popular CulturalImages of Criminalsand Prisoners
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In the end, we are left with a sort of default narrative that
assigns blame neither on an individual nor on a societal basis.
Significantly, both the standard narrative about individual choice
and responsibility and the counter-story about societal responsibility
are accounts that attach to individual offenders. The former story
is about what a particular actor decided to do; the latter is about
society's responsibility for maintaining the conditions that caused
the actor to choose as he or she did.33 1 By contrast, the distorted
discourse that has begun to replace both of these more familiar
narratives functions at the level of the group rather than the

individual. 3 2
Now we get accounts about "criminals" and "young hoodlums."3 '3 These are accounts that assign blame and responsibility
to an entire group by setting up a "we/they polarity"; by excluding
"them" from "our" community altogether.3

4

Central to the

Since Attica, 18 SOCIALJUSTICE 48 (1991). Munro-Bjorklund noted that:
Drug crimes presented as entertainment are becoming increasingly
popular as publicity on the problem increases. Programs such as "48
Hours," "20/20," and other television "magazines" frequently include stories
on drug crime from a variety of perspectives (law enforcement, medical
involvement, youth crime). "DEA" includes dramatizations and actual drugbust footage. While it is more exciting to watch a SWAT team break into
a suspected drug house, wave around a variety of weapons, handcuff the
occupants, and tear through the cupboards than it is to see an officer stop
a drunk driver, both are substance-abuse crimes. The media prefer [sic] to
emphasize the image of the often Black drug user/dealer than of the often
white and white-collar alcohol abuser.

Id. at 64.
For a good first-person account of how generalized class and race characteristics
have come to stand in for individualized judgments about a particular actor's
criminality, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, The Death of the Profane, in THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 44 (1991).

331 See West, supra note 136, at 171, 174.
552 Doyle refers to this process as "[a] technique of mass portrait-by-implication."
Doyle supra note 313, at 89. The most significant feature of this distorted discourse
is that a defendant of color-like all residents of the inner city-is "treated as part of
the natural scene, not [as] a social being," id. at 72, as "a kind of undifferentiated
brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral insects," id. at 78 (quoting GEORGE
ORWELL, Marrakech, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYSJOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE
ORwELL, 387, 387-88(1968)), or as "chow" for the criminal justice system, id. at 80
(quoting TOM WOLFE, BONFIRE OF THE VANITIEs 39-40 (1987))
3 In Williams's account, the relevant group is "17-year-old black males wearing
running shoes and hooded sweatshirts." WILLIAMS, supra note 330 at 44. In the
words of a Florida judge, "young Caucasian teachers" in the public schools "have quit
because they couldn't tolerate-those hoodlums have made them quit-because they
couldn't tolerate the danger. That's a fact." In re Petitionfor Removal ofa ChiefJudge,
592 So. 2d at 675.
'" Munro-Bjorklud, supra note 330, at 66-67 (discussing the media's coverage of
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creation of these two distinct communities is the sense that while
"we" in the larger society are morally accountable, autonomous
individuals, "they" in the inner city are wholly without any moral
dimension. As James Doyle puts it-"[t]hey apparently kill without
reason. They apparently are not afraid of being killed. They kill
their old folks; they kill their young. They have the predator's inbred love of packs."33 5
This is "rigidly binomial opposition of
'ours' and 'theirs. ' "33 6
"Here, in suburbia, is ours; There, in the
[inner city], is theirs. Here is normal; There is different. Here is
33 7
civilized; There is primitive."
The larger danger in this set of developments is that the basis
for desert in many cases will no longer be derived simply from what
the offender has done, but also from who he or she is. Where the
theory behind criminal law blaming is that individuals are called to
account for their autonomous choices when those choices run afoul
of communal norms, the increasing danger is that whole groups are
being called to account for the "crime" of standing outside of the
community, quite apart from any particular freely chosen behavior
on their part.33 8
Where the lesson that ought to be imparted
through the criminal law is supportive of an intentionalist morality,
the unsettling truth is that the daily routine of processing too many
criminal defendants has the potential to teach us a new lesson about
the inevitability of choice given the determinist features of our
33 9
fragmented society.

the Willie Horton case during the 1988 Presidential election and stating that "[b]y
using Willie Horton to symbolize the crime problem in America, Bush called up
myriad conscious and unconscious fears"). Id. at 66.
335 Doyle, supra note 313, at 82.
336 Id. at 90 (quoting EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 227 (1979)).
337 Id.

338 In a recent article Thomas Ross has made a similar claim with respect to what
he terms the "rhetoric of poverty." Ross identifies a number of implicit assumptions
about the inherent immorality of poor people which run throughout the Supreme
Court's opinions in the welfare area. He argues that the rhetoric that pervades this
case law is premised upon a view of the poor as fundamentally different from the rest
of "us," and suggests that people in poverty are thought to be immoral because they
are poor, while other Americans are thought to be trustworthy because they are not.
See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, OurHelplessness, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1499, 1499 (1991). To the extent that the "community" is defined by reference
to a common morality, see KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 9-13 (1966), this

systematic differentiation of "the poor" and "the not poor" works to create two
distinct communities.
339 On December 22, 1984, four young African-American men approached
Bernhard Goetz on a New York subway car and demanded that he give them five
dollars. The precise details of what ensued are still unclear. It is uncontroverted,

1992] CONSTRUCTION OFRESPONSIBILITYIN CRIMINAL LAW

2331

CONCLUSION

Too much should not be made of the distinction between
substantive law and legal process; nevertheless, there is an apparent
inconsistency in the foregoing analysis the resolution of which
requires that such a distinction be drawn. Earlier, the claim was
made that a loss-of-control defense for chemically-dependent
defendants has been unsuccessful in the courts because its acceptance would have imposed a determinist account upon a fundamentally intentionalist system. Subsequently, the claim was made that
the policy of treating drug possession, public intoxication, and the
like as crimes has had a similar effect: that of undermining the
criminal justice system's capacity to articulate an intentionalist
ideology.
The resolution of this seeming contradiction lies in the fact that
the loss-of-control defense rejected in cases like Moore was part of
a formal legal strategy that advocated substantive reforms in the
doctrine governing excuses. As we have seen, this strategy failed
because of the fundamental irreconcilability of intentionalism and
determinism. On the other hand, the defacto process of managing
cases within an overloaded criminal justice system in a fashion
which precludes the articulation of intentionalist narratives, coupled

however, that Goetz responded by firing a .38 revolver at the men. One of them,
Darrell Cabey, was hit; his spinal cord was severed. For a good account of the Goetz
case, see GEORGE P. FLETcHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GoETz AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL (1988). Although the case did not involve alcohol or drugs, it was

laced with the kind of rhetoric that the current drug war has exacerbated.
Throughout Goetz's trial, his counsel proffered two related messages. The first
was that the four men were somehow outside of the community of civilized citizens
of New York. Thus, throughout the proceedings this lawyer referred to them as
"predators", "vultures," and "savages." See id. at 206. The second message was that
the four deserved to be assaulted at close range with an automatic pistol-indeed, one
defense witness actually stated that "they got what they deserved." Id. at 28. These
two ideas are related, and related to the larger issue raised in this article, because the
conduct of Darrell Cabey and the others was not "deserving" of Goetz's response.
Rather, the clear implication of these messages was that the four young men deserved
what happened to them because of their status.
The defense mounted by Goetz's lawyers ultimately prevailed, and he was
acquitted of all the serious charges stemming from this incident. Distressingly, that
outcome met with strong support from the majority of New Yorkers. See id. at 199.
The Goetz episode suggests that a new vision of desert, one that is fundamentally
incompatible with our moral traditions, has been established in the United States. As
the criminal justice system increasingly becomes a captive of the drug war, this new
vision has the potential to overwhelm the foundations of our blaming practices, and
to deny the essential personhood of the individual members of numerous subordinated groups.
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with an overrepresentation of defendants of color, has had the
quality of introducing new determinist elements into our formal
blaming practices.
The irony is that while substantive doctrinal reform which posed
a danger to the ideological functioning of the system was turned
back in cases like Powell and Moore, an equally destabilizing
phenomenon has made its way into the system as a function of
enforcement strategy and procedural necessity. The ability of the
criminal law to perform its institutional role in society, as a
consequence, has been placed in jeopardy. Sadly, thousands of
chemically-dependent offenders have also suffered as a result of this
set of decisions.

